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INTRODUCTION 
When the United States has a vigorous and apparently healthy President, 
as it generally does, its arrangements for ensuring presidential continuity 
receive little scrutiny.  The absence of a current or recent succession crisis 
focuses attention on more immediate concerns.  The ordinary indifference 
to presidential continuity issues finds further justification in the common 
belief that the system has always proven adequate to deal with whatever 
circumstances history has presented, a perception which encourages 
confidence that it will also handle those contingencies the future imposes. 
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For a variety of reasons, some academics and activists who study 
presidential continuity reject this popular consensus.1  They point to gaps in 
the system and the number of times the nation has narrowly avoided some 
continuity crises and discount as naïve and optimistic the conclusion that 
these past escapes predict future deliverance.  They imagine that disaster, if 
not just around the corner, lurks somewhere in the future and, absent 
corrective action, will someday leave the nation without a functioning 
President. 
Discussions of America’s arrangements for ensuring presidential 
continuity tend to proceed in one of two general directions.  Some criticize 
various aspects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as inadequate to deal with 
the topics they address.  More recent complaints have targeted the 
provisions for declaring a President disabled,2 although the method for 
filling a vice presidential vacancy has not entirely escaped criticism.3  
Alternatively, another body of work views the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as 
a step forward but identifies troubling gaps in areas it does not regulate, 
such as the lack of procedures to declare a President disabled in the absence 
of a Vice President, the lack of a method to declare a Vice President 
disabled, the problematic line of succession after the Vice President, and a 
host of contingencies which could prevent the electoral system from 
producing an appropriate and functioning President by inauguration day.4 
In fact, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment constituted a major advance that 
remedied some of the most glaring problems regarding presidential 
continuity.  It operates in an area made complex by a number of factors 
including the variety of continuity crises which may arise, the difficult 
context in which they typically occur, the demands they impose for quick 
human decision, and the impediments to adequate preparation for that 
response.  At its most basic level, the Amendment added several new 
 
 1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Address, Applications and Implications of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2, 7–9 (2010); see also John C. Fortier & Norman J. 
Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 
993–94 (2004); Joel K. Goldstein, Commentary, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential 
Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Herbert L. Abrams, Can the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Deal with a 
Disabled President?  Preventing Future White House Cover-Ups, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
115, 129 (1999). 
 3. See, e.g., Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment:  Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 67–70 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 
Senate Hearings] (statement of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., presidential historian and 
scholar); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., What to Do About a Nonjob, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1974, at 
39 (calling for repeal of Section 2 and ultimately abolition of Vice Presidency); Editorial, 
Vice President Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1973, at 40 (criticizing implementation of Section 
2); Warren Weaver, Jr., Law Experts Critical of 25th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
1974, at 16 (quoting scholars and legislators criticizing aspects of Section 2); Tom Wicker, 
Why Rush to Change the 25th?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1974, at 43 (calling for special 
presidential election if Section 2 Vice President becomes President).   
 4. See, e.g., CONTINUTITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS:  THE 
CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY 39–43 (2009), available at 
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/SecondReport.pdf; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 71–
83. 
962 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
provisions to the Constitution to govern presidential succession and 
inability and vice presidential vacancy.  It constructively addressed the two 
most pressing problems regarding presidential continuity in a manner that 
made prudent accommodations between different principles.  Although its 
initial applications during its first forty-three years have been limited, it has 
worked quite well in diverse contexts, and there is no reason it should not 
do so in the future. 
Yet the alarmists are also right.  Reason for concern remains.  Existing 
arrangements to ensure presidential continuity are inadequate to address a 
number of foreseeable contingencies.  The remaining shortcomings do not 
represent failings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Even if its ambition 
had been to solve every continuity problem, such an outcome was well 
beyond the reach of any single measure.  That it did not eliminate every gap 
does not diminish the substantial contributions it made. 
Nonetheless, gaps remain, some of which create an unacceptable risk that 
the United States will find itself without a functioning Chief Executive 
whose exercise of presidential powers and duties is seen as legitimate.  
These defects include those relating to the line of succession after the Vice 
President.  They require attention.  Soon. 
 Yet reform in this area comes slowly (or not at all) and with great 
difficulty.  Invariably, interest in the topic peaks when a crisis occurs “but 
subsides once the emergency has passed.”5  Decision makers tend to be 
preoccupied by more immediate concerns, an understandable orientation 
which relegates continuity problems, contingent by nature, to future 
agendas.  When decision makers do consider these issues, familiar obstacles 
often stymie reform.  Some problems seem intractable.  Some preferred 
remedies offend interested parties.  The range of proposals makes 
consensus elusive.  The political payoff is small,6 and accordingly, public 
officials lack the requisite incentive to invest the necessary resources to 
convert ideas into law. 
Recent events confirm this sorry pattern.  The attacks of 9/11 could have 
presented the greatest threat to governmental continuity in American 
history.  Surely that assault should have prompted policy makers to act to 
reinforce vulnerable parts of our system.  Although the Continuity of 
Government Commission produced insightful studies7 and a few disparate 
hearings were held, more than nine years have passed yet public officials 
 
 5. Presidential Inability:  Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. 
Emanuel Celler). 
 6. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on 
S.J. Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 149–50 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of 
John D. Feerick, scholar on presidential succession) (“Inability and succession are not 
election issues.  Few votes will turn on whether or not this committee or the Congress does 
anything about these issues.”). 
 7. See CONTINUTITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS:  THE 
CONTINUTITY OF CONGRESS (2003), available at http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/
report/FirstReport.pdf; CONTINUTITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4. 
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have taken no action to close easily observable gaps in our system for 
assuring presidential continuity. 
This combination, of known persistent continuity gaps without a 
corresponding impulse to reform, makes this an auspicious occasion to 
reexamine the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  It remains the most successful 
effort to address those continuity problems inherent in the original 
Constitution or which subsequently developed.  Lessons from that 
experience may help reformers act to resolve at least some of the remaining 
shortcomings.  In addition to its provisions, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
represents certain implicit constitutional values that should guide responses 
to remaining problems.  Moreover, it was the product of successful 
legislative strategies in an area that generally resists such measures.  
Although all of these principles and lessons do not point in the same 
direction and some have limited application to the remaining issues, others 
should inform efforts to close existing gaps in the system to ensure 
presidential continuity. 
Part I of this Article briefly outlines the context in which the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment was proposed and ratified, describes the contributions it 
has made, and argues that it has worked well.  Part II identifies 
constitutional and legislative principles associated with it.  Part III sketches 
the modern context.  Part IV assesses the current line of successors after the 
Vice President, identifies problems with it, and suggests how some of the 
principles relating to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might help remedy 
some of the remaining problems. 
I. TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND WHAT IT BROUGHT 
In 1965 Congress proposed, and in 1967 the states ratified, the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, thereby addressing the two most conspicuous and 
significant dilemmas relating to presidential continuity as they existed in 
the mid-1960s.  These problems were the absence of constitutional clarity 
regarding, or procedures to handle, presidential inability, and the possibility 
that someone other than a Vice President might become President. 
A.  The Context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The constitutional gaps just mentioned had existed since the earliest days 
of the Republic.8  Five developments during the middle of the twentieth 
century created the political context that contributed to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. 
First, in 1947, Congress changed the line of succession following the 
Vice President to begin with the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and then the President pro tempore of the Senate before continuing through 
the Cabinet.9  When Harry S. Truman succeeded to the Presidency in April 
 
 8. See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION (1965). 
 9. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified 
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).  
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1945, upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Edward 
R. Stettinius, Jr. stood a heartbeat away from the Presidency.  Inasmuch as 
Stettinius was a businessman, federal bureaucrat, and diplomat but lacked 
any political experience, Truman named former U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
James F. Byrnes, who was thought to be a presidential figure, to replace 
him,10 and Congress, at Truman’s suggestion, placed the Speaker atop the 
line of succession.  Truman did not believe he should have power to appoint 
his successor and argued that the Speaker had an electoral pedigree 
surpassed only by those of the President and Vice President.11 
Second, the advent of the nuclear age and of the Cold War added 
importance to the Presidency and accordingly lent urgency to the subject of 
presidential succession and inability.  Those threatening conditions made 
more perilous the prospect of a hiatus in executive power or the presence of 
a Chief Executive not equipped to exercise it.  In an earlier age of “carrier 
pigeons” when the Army depended on “horse-drawn caissons,” presidential 
continuity had lacked such urgency, Senator Birch Bayh, the principal 
author of the Amendment, suggested.12  But by 1965, “with the awesome 
power at our disposal,” when armies could be moved “half way around the 
world in a matter of hours” and civilization could be destroyed in a matter 
of minutes, it was “high time” to heed history to “make absolutely certain” 
that there would always be a functioning President.13 
Third, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s three illnesses, especially his 
heart attack in 1955 and his stroke in 1957, focused the attention of policy 
makers and the public on the problem of presidential inability.14  Defects in 
the existing legal regime were readily apparent.  It provided no procedures 
for determining the existence or duration of a presidential disability nor did 
it make clear whether the President could subsequently resume the exercise 
of presidential powers and duties.  Committees in each house began looking 
at the topic in the mid-1950s,15 as did the executive branch.16  Attorneys 
General Herbert Brownell and William P. Rogers presented administration 
proposals for constitutional amendments in 1957 and 1958, respectively.17  
Eisenhower and Vice President Richard M. Nixon entered into a letter 
agreement that provided for Eisenhower or Nixon to initiate a transfer to 
Nixon of presidential powers on a temporary basis with Eisenhower 
retaining the right to resume those powers on his simple declaration that he 
 
 10. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 368 (1992). 
 11. Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, PUB. PAPERS 
128, 129 (June 19, 1945).  
 12. 111 CONG. REC. 15,595 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 211–29; see also HERBERT BROWNELL WITH JOHN P. 
BURKE, ADVISING IKE:  THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 273–78 
(1993); RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 131–81 (1962). 
 15. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 238–42. 
 16. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 277–78; FEERICK, supra note 8, at 227–29. 
 17. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 239–41; John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential 
Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 113–15 (1963). 
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was ready to do so.18  John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Johnson 
and Speaker of the House of Representatives John McCormack, and 
Johnson and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey later entered into the 
same agreement.19 
Fourth, the Nixon and Johnson Vice Presidencies contributed to a 
perception that the Vice Presidency had assumed new importance.  The 
office was attracting more able public figures who were being given roles 
within the executive branch and were becoming more visible.20 
Finally, the Kennedy assassination generated new interest in the topic.  It 
suggested that even the presence of a young and ostensibly healthy 
President21 did not immunize America from continuity issues.  Johnson’s 
history of a serious heart attack made his health seem precarious.  The 
vision of McCormack and Senate President pro tempore Carl Hayden 
behind him when he addressed Congress did not inspire confidence.  
Neither had ever been considered presidential timber nor did they project 
any sense of vigor as they slumped in their chairs.22 
The time was ripe for reform.  Inadequacies in existing arrangements 
stood revealed. The risks of inaction were apparent, based in part on a 
recognition that the world had changed and that America could not assume 
that it would inevitably escape continuity problems as it had in the past.  As 
President Johnson put it, 
Our escape has been more the result of Providence than of any prudence 
on our part.  For it is not necessary to conjure the nightmare of nuclear 
holocaust or other national catastrophe to identify these omissions as 
 
 18. Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the 
Event of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196 (Mar. 3, 1958). 
 19. Statement of Procedures for Use in the Event of Presidential Inability, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1044 (Oct. 5, 1965); The President’s News Conference of December 18, 1963, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 65–66 (Dec. 18, 1963) (reporting that Johnson and McCormack had made the same 
disability agreement as Kennedy and Johnson); White House Statement and Text of 
Agreement Between the President and the Vice President on Procedures in the Event of 
Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10, 1961) (describing the agreement between 
Kennedy and Johnson); Charles Mohr, Johnson Reaches Disability Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
28, 1965, at 13 (reporting that Johnson and Humphrey had adopted the Eisenhower-Nixon 
agreement). 
 20. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 151–54, 190–93 (1982). 
 21. See generally ROBERT DALLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE:  JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917–1963, 
at 397–99, 471–73 (2003) (discussing Kennedy’s health problems as President); ROSE 
MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND DECISIONMAKING 118–56 (2008) 
(documenting Kennedy’s precarious health). 
 22. Cf.; Arthur Krock, In the Nation:  The Cart Is Getting Ahead of the Horse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1963, at 38 (noting preoccupation with succession, rather than inability, 
owing to the “advanced ages” of McCormack and Hayden); Arthur Krock, Succession 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1963, at E9 (noting Johnson’s precarious health and the age of 
McCormack and Hayden); James Reston, Washington:  The Problem of Succession to the 
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1963, at 34 (stating McCormack unqualified to be 
President); Editorial, The Succession, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1963, at 20 (noting questions 
regarding McCormack and Hayden); Two Old Timers Next in Line for Presidency of U.S., 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1963, at 30 (discussing the fact that McCormack and Hayden were well 
beyond the age of Presidents).  
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chasms of chaos into which normal human frailties might plunge us at any 
time.23 
B.  Presidential Inability 
The Constitution, as originally ratified was ambiguous regarding 
presidential inability, and subsequent developments compounded that 
uncertainty.  The Constitution simply provided that “[i]n Case of the 
Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same 
shall devolve on the Vice President.”24  The text did not make clear whether 
“the same” referred to the presidential powers and duties or the office itself.  
After William Henry Harrison became the first President to die in office in 
1841, Vice President John Tyler claimed that he was President, not simply 
the Vice President acting as President.25  Although Tyler’s claim probably 
contradicted the Framers’ intent, later Vice Presidents who found 
themselves in that situation embraced his position and ultimately the Tyler 
Precedent became accepted as constitutional reality.  Whether the successor 
became President or acting President made no formal difference if the 
vacancy was permanent (i.e. death, resignation, or removal) but that 
distinction had significant impact in the case of presidential inability, the 
one event in which the President’s departure could be temporary.  If the 
presidential office devolved on the Vice President in case of the President’s 
“[i]nability to discharge the Powers and Duties of [his] Office,”26 that 
transfer would displace the President.  The Constitution provided for one 
President at a time and offered no way for an ousted President to return to 
office other than through the electoral system.  If, however, only the 
presidential powers and duties devolved on the Vice President, the office 
remained with the President, and he could presumably reclaim its powers 
and duties. 
The constitutional ambiguity, compounded by the Tyler Precedent, 
complicated matters when presidential disabilities arose, primarily during 
the Garfield,27 Wilson,28 and Eisenhower29 administrations.  Presidents and 
those around them were often not anxious to consider transferring power to 
the Vice President in part for fear that so doing might permanently displace 
 
 23. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 100, 101 (Jan. 28, 1965); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of 
Rep. Emanuel Celler) (“Fate has been most kind to Americans, but we should not continue 
to tempt it.”); id. at 7945 (statement of Rep. Robert Stafford) (“We have trifled with fate too 
long.”); id. at 7952 (statement of Rep. Harold Donohue) (“It may well be considered among 
our greatest blessings that, as yet, no confounding catastrophe has erupted out of vacancies 
in the vice-presidency or presidential incapacity.”). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 25. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 92–94. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 27. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 118–39. 
 28. See id. at 162–80. 
 29. See id. at 211–29. 
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the Chief Executive.  Vice Presidents were reluctant to act.30  Vice 
President Chester A. Arthur took no action during the eighty days during 
which President James A. Garfield lay in a coma between the assassination 
attempt and his death in 1881.31  Garfield and Arthur were from rival 
factions of the Republican party, and their political enmity further 
complicated the situation.32  Vice President Thomas Marshall did not 
discharge presidential powers during the seven months when a stroke 
largely incapacitated Woodrow Wilson.33  Wilson and Marshall were both 
progressive Democrats, but Marshall, like virtually all other Vice Presidents 
of his era, had relatively little involvement in the executive branch.  Vice 
President Richard M. Nixon participated more fully in the Eisenhower 
Administration but presidential power remained with Eisenhower during his 
1955 heart attack, his 1956 surgery under anesthesia following an ileitis 
attack, and his 1957 stroke and period of convalescence.34 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment addressed presidential inability indirectly 
in Section 1 and directly in Sections 3 and 4.  Section 135 simply performed 
constitutional housekeeping.  It imported into the text of the Constitution 
the Tyler Precedent with respect to the three situations in which an event 
ended the president’s claim to the office—death, resignation, and 
removal—thereby separating those events from that of inability.  Section 
336 provided a means whereby the President could voluntarily transfer 
powers and duties to the Vice President, subject to the right to reclaim 
them.  Section 437 provided a mechanism whereby the Vice President and 
 
 30. The structure of political institutions gave further reason for inaction.  For much of 
American history, Vice Presidents often came from rival wings of the President’s political 
party.  Until 1940, the presidential nominee had little input in the choice of his running mate.  
Finally, Vice Presidents functioned primarily in the legislative branch as President of the 
Senate and had relatively little involvement in the business of the executive branch. 
 31. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 125. 
 32. See id. at 120–21. 
 33. See id. at 166–79 (summarizing the period between Wilson’s stroke on September 
25, 1919 and the first Cabinet meeting on April 13, 1920). 
 34. See id. at 217–20; NIXON, supra note 14, at 144–49, 167–68, 174–75. 
 35. Section 1 provides:  “In case of the removal of the President from office or of his 
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, 
§ 1. 
 36. Section 3 provides: 
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to 
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be 
discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. 
id. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 37. Section 4 provides: 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately 
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. 
  Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that 
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the principal officers of the executive branch or such replacement body as 
Congress might create could remove presidential powers and duties from 
the Chief Executive.  The President could reclaim those powers and duties 
but, if the moving parties contested his or her fitness, Congress would 
decide the issue. 
C.  Vice Presidential Vacancy 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment also addressed the problem of vice 
presidential vacancy, a contingency which had occurred sixteen times 
before 1967, eight times following presidential deaths (and vice presidential 
successions),38 seven times following vice presidential deaths,39 and once 
following a vice presidential resignation.40  The Constitution provided no 
means to fill a vice presidential vacancy prior to the next quadrennial 
election.  Instead, it covered the Vice President’s constitutionally prescribed 
functions by empowering the Senate to choose a President pro tempore in 
his absence41 and authorizing Congress to identify an officer to act as 
President in case of a double vacancy.42  The absence of a procedure to fill 
a vice presidential vacancy had two related consequences—the Vice 
 
no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the 
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within 
four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office.  Thereupon Congress shall decide 
the issue, assembling within forty eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If 
the Congress, within twenty one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, 
or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty one days after Congress is required 
to assemble, determines by two thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall 
continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall 
resume the powers and duties of his office. 
Id. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 38. The Presidents who died in office, the Vice Presidents who succeeded them, and the 
dates of the Presidents’ deaths are as follows:  William Henry Harrison (John Tyler, April 4, 
1841), Zachary Taylor (Millard Fillmore, July 9, 1850), Abraham Lincoln (Andrew Johnson, 
April 15, 1865), James A. Garfield (Chester A. Arthur, September 19, 1881), William 
McKinley (Theodore Roosevelt, September 14, 1901), Warren G. Harding (Calvin Coolidge, 
August 2, 1923), Franklin D. Roosevelt (Harry S. Truman, April 12, 1945), and John F. 
Kennedy (Lyndon B. Johnson, November 22, 1963). See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 315.   
 39. Vice Presidents George Clinton (April 20, 1812), Elbridge Gerry (November 23, 
1814), William Rufus King (April 18, 1853), Henry Wilson (November 22, 1875), Thomas 
A. Hendricks (November 25, 1885), Garret A. Hobart (November 21, 1899), and James S. 
Sherman (October 30, 1912) died in office. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 316. 
 40. John C. Calhoun resigned in the last few months of his term (December 28, 1832) to 
accept election as senator from South Carolina. See JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE 
PRICE OF UNION:  A BIOGRAPHY 192–93 (1988). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a 
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the 
Office of President of the United States.”). 
 42. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability 
be removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
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Presidency would remain unoccupied until the end of the term, and during 
that time some other government figure would be next in line to the 
Presidency.  Congress had passed three succession laws adopting different 
strategies—in 1792, placing the President pro tempore and Speaker of the 
House of Representatives in line with provision for a special election of a 
President;43 in 1886, placing the Cabinet members beginning with the 
Secretary of State in line;44 and in 1947, placing the Speaker, then the 
President pro tempore, then the Cabinet.45  Following the Kennedy 
assassination, the enhanced significance of the Vice Presidency, coupled 
with the concerns regarding alternative lines of succession, created interest 
for the first time in providing a means to fill vice presidential vacancies. 
Section 246 provided a procedure to fill a vice presidential vacancy 
whereby the President would nominate a Vice President subject to 
confirmation by both houses of Congress.  As is suggested below, the 
provision reflected a new vision of the Vice Presidency which saw that 
office as an important advisor and assistant to the President.  It also flowed 
from an appreciation of the virtues of the Vice Presidency as the first 
successor and the relative disadvantages of alternative successors. 
D.  First Implementations 
Developments since 1967 have tested the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Events to date do not cover the landscape of possibilities, and 
the response, in some instances, was not optimal.  Nonetheless, the first 
implementations of several provisions of the Amendment provide evidence 
that it works well and encourage confidence in its further application. 
1.  Presidential Succession 
Not too much should be made of the successful application of Section 1, 
which governed the succession of Gerald R. Ford to the Presidency upon 
Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974.  Section 1, after all, simply 
confirmed that the Tyler Precedent applied to death, resignation, and 
removal of the President.  Ford succeeded to the Presidency as had eight 
Vice Presidents before him, although this time following resignation, not 
death, of his predecessor, and at the end, not near the beginning, of a 
national trauma. 
 
 43. See Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9, 10, 1 Stat. 239, 240–41 (repealed 1886) 
(relating to “the Election of a President and Vice President of the United States, and 
declaring the Officer who shall act as President in case of Vacancies in the offices both of 
President and Vice President”).  
 44. See Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).   
 45. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified 
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)). 
 46. Section 2 provides:  “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon 
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, 
§ 2. 
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2.  Filling Vice Presidential Vacancy 
Section 2, however, did work quite well in 1973 and 1974 when Ford, 
and then Nelson A. Rockefeller, were nominated and confirmed as Vice 
President.  The first implementation of the Amendment was occasioned by 
unforeseen circumstances; a President under cloud of criminal behavior 
nominated a potential Vice President to fill a vacancy created by the 
resignation of a Vice President charged with criminal behavior.  The 
vacancy was created by the resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew 
as part of a plea agreement to avoid prosecution for bribery,47 only the 
second time a Vice President had resigned and the first in circumstances 
that suggested unfitness to hold office.  Nixon, who was subject to 
impeachment proceedings for obstruction of justice in connection with the 
Watergate offenses, nominated Agnew’s successor.  In the heightened 
ethical environment following Watergate and Agnew’s resignation due to 
alleged criminal improprieties, an intense investigation of Ford was to be 
expected.  Some 350 FBI agents spent three weeks investigating Ford and 
produced 1700 pages of new data; some fifty agents from the Internal 
Revenue Service, General Accounting Office, and the Senate Rules 
Committee staff also participated.48 
Although the bizarre scenario that led to the vacancy was not anticipated, 
those who wrote the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had foreseen the possibility 
of a second complicating factor—a Congress controlled by the President’s 
opposing party.49  When Nixon nominated Ford in October 1973 and when 
Ford nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller ten months later, the Democratic 
party held majorities in both the House of Representatives and Senate.50  
Divided control had two implications for the proceedings.  The Democratic 
Speaker of the House stood next in line so that Nixon’s removal would 
change party control of the White House.  Moreover, the Democrats would 
run the confirmation process in both houses and could defeat the 
nomination. 
The first implementations of Section 2 ran remarkably well and made a 
historic contribution to the American constitutional system.  Circumstances 
did not allow Nixon to select his first choice, former Texas Governor and 
Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally.  Members of both parties 
opposed his selection.  Other high risk potential nominees—Governors 
Ronald Reagan and Nelson Rockefeller—also provoked opposition in both 
 
 47. See generally RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY:  THE 
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 341–53 (1974). 
 48. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
EARLIEST APPLICATIONS 135–36 (2d ed. 1992); Marjorie Hunter, Senate Committee to Begin 
Hearings Today on Ford Nomination as Vice President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1973, at 32. 
 49. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 48 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 50. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2010); Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), OFFICE 
OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
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parties.51  But the idea that the Democrats could impose a mere caretaker, 
although suggested by some,52 was quickly rejected by Senator Birch Bayh, 
the principal author of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, as inconsistent with 
its intent.53  Ultimately, Nixon nominated House Minority Leader Gerald R. 
Ford, who commanded broad support on both sides of the aisle.54  Ford had 
never been a presidential prospect but he had been considered as a possible 
vice presidential candidate and had served as the House leader for eight 
years. 
Ford’s confirmation in less than two months was impressive especially 
when the surrounding circumstances are considered.  Since it constituted 
the first application of Section 2, government officials involved had no 
precedents from which to draw.  Neither the Senate Rules Committee nor 
the House Judiciary Committee had ever before held hearings on a 
nominee.  The opposition party had large majorities in both the House and 
Senate.  Nixon, the President who nominated Ford, was facing a likely 
impeachment inquiry.  That proceeding became inevitable after Nixon 
ordered the firing of Archibald Cox, the independent counsel investigating 
high officials in the Nixon Administration, only eight days after Ford’s 
nomination, in the “Saturday Night Massacre.”55  That dramatic and 
shocking episode worsened the temper of American politics, further 
undermined Nixon’s legitimacy, and presented another obstacle for Ford’s 
confirmation.56  The “national turmoil” that ensued pushed Nixon’s 
approval rating below thirty percent,57 a precipitous decline for a President 
re-elected in a forty-nine state landslide less than one year earlier. 
Moreover, circumstances mandated a full inquiry.  Ironically, Ford’s 
popularity in Congress, especially in the House, provided reason to proceed 
deliberately.  Speaker Carl Albert worried that too speedy a confirmation 
might appear to reflect cronyism that would undermine Ford’s legitimacy 
and that of the Section 2 process.58  The Agnew debacle made even more 
 
 51. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 131; Congress to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1 
(quoting Democratic leaders predicting opposition to certain high profile choices). 
 52. See John Herbers, All Rumors, and None of Them Are Very Good, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
23, 1973, at E1 (reporting Democratic sentiment against nomination of presidential 
possibility). 
 53. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 131 (quoting Sen. Bayh). 
 54. See generally JAMES CANNON, TIME AND CHANCE:  GERALD R. FORD’S APPOINTMENT 
WITH HISTORY (1994); RICHARD NIXON, RN:  THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 925–27 
(1978) (stating that Ford was the first choice of Congressmen); BARRY WERTH, 31 DAYS:  
THE CRISIS THAT GAVE US THE GOVERNMENT WE HAVE TODAY 37 (2006) (stating that Nixon 
felt precluded from selecting his preference, Connally, due to Watergate and bipartisan 
political opposition). 
 55. See FEERICK, supra note 48, at 136.   
 56. Douglas E. Kneeland, Bork Takes Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1973, at 1; Warren 
Weaver, Jr., Court Rebuffed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1973, at 1, 16 (reporting possible 
problems for Ford’s confirmation from Nixon’s conduct). 
 57. Nixon Plan on Prosecutor is Opposed by Mansfield, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1973, at 1.  
 58. Marjorie Hunter, A Congress Delay on Ford Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1973, at 
27 (stating Congressmen from both parties believe a quick confirmation would be a 
mistake); Marjorie Hunter, Ford and Albert Deal with Deep Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
1973, at 12. 
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necessary a careful examination of Ford’s record insofar as it reflected on 
his character.59  Ford was widely perceived not simply as a Vice President 
but as a likely President given Nixon’s increasingly perilous political 
situation.60  Bayh recognized that the Ford confirmation process would 
establish a precedent and accordingly urged against a perfunctory 
consideration.61  Nixon’s nomination of Ford was viewed positively by 
47% and negatively by 34%; by contrast, in late October 1973, Nixon’s 
handling of the Presidency was viewed negatively 64% to 32%.62  
Ultimately, Ford was approved, 92 to 3, in the Senate and 387 to 35 in the 
House.63  Although all who voted against the nomination were Democrats, 
the overwhelming number of Democrats supported Ford’s confirmation.64 
The existence of Section 2 played a critical role in extricating America 
from the unique circumstance created by the concurrent criminal and 
constitutional proceedings against Agnew and Nixon.  The presence of a 
procedure to install a new Republican Vice President, and accordingly a 
Republican successor to Nixon, minimized the role of partisan 
considerations.  The Nixon Justice Department could work to remove 
Agnew without fear of placing, for a prolonged period of time, the 
Democratic Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, next in line behind a 
President who was facing an increasingly serious impeachment proceeding.  
Those proceedings against Nixon could go forward without fear that his 
removal would shift party control.  Republican leaders could ultimately 
encourage Nixon to resign, a move that did not jeopardize their party’s 
control of the White House for the remainder of the term but strengthened 
its chances to retain it. 
The Rockefeller confirmation took four months from nomination to 
confirmation, more than twice the length of Ford’s.  Ford consulted widely 
and vetted a number of candidates for more than ten days before 
determining that Rockefeller was his first choice.65  A desire of some 
congressional Democrats to sideline Rockefeller from participating in the 
1974 midterm elections may have played some part in the delay,66 but 
other, legitimate and nonpartisan factors also contributed and were the 
 
 59. Editorial, Action on Mr. Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1973, at 32. 
 60. Approval on Floor is Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1973, at 1; Editorial, A Future 
President?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1973, at 30; Ford Tells Rumor of Oil Release, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 17, 1973, at S4 (quoting Congressman that Ford would be President within a year); 
Michael J. Harrington, Opposes Ford for V.P., CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1973, at S12; Marjorie 
Hunter, 1 Man Being Interviewed for 2 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1973, at E2; Marjorie 
Hunter, Senate Unit Backs Ford, 9 to 0; McGovern Predicts Nixon Ouster in Year, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 12, 1973, at 13; see FEERICK, supra note 48, at 142 (quoting predictions Ford 
would be President). 
 61. Richard L. Madden, Choice is Praised by Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1973, 
at 1. 
 62. Louis Harris, Nixon’s Rating Still at Bottom, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 1973, at 26. 
 63. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 141, 149–50. 
 64. Id. at 129–52.   
 65. WERTH, supra note 54, at 61–63, 93–95, 100–03, 107–09, 114–16, 119, 138–40. 
 66. See GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL 224 (1979) (blaming the delay on partisan 
politics). 
2010] LESSONS IN ENSURING PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY 973 
major reason the Rockefeller proceedings were so much more protracted.  
The enormous Rockefeller family wealth introduced new issues, raised 
questions regarding conflicts of interest, and required additional research.67  
During the course of hearings, a number of disclosures required further 
investigation and additional hearings.  For instance, Rockefeller had made 
substantial cash gifts to various state and national officials including 
members of Congress.68  He had also denied involvement with financing a 
book disparaging a serious opponent in the 1970 gubernatorial campaign; in 
fact, Rockefeller’s brother had largely financed the effort and Rockefeller 
had been advised of the project.69  An IRS audit found Rockefeller owed 
more than $900,000 in additional taxes.70  The complexity of Rockefeller’s 
record juxtaposed with the heightened focus on public ethics in the 
Watergate era made it predictable that Congress would move deliberately.  
Rockefeller’s nomination required seventeen days of public hearings.  John 
D. Feerick later observed that “serious questions” imposed a need for 
further investigation and examination as a predicate for public confidence in 
the process.71  Rockefeller’s public support declined during the 
proceedings,72 and some original supporters, like Senator Barry M. 
Goldwater, were publicly acknowledging second thoughts by late 
October.73 
The normal congressional interlude incident to the midterm campaigns 
also delayed consideration.  Congress was in recess for the elections from 
mid-October to mid-November.  In mid-November, the Senate Rules 
Committee reconvened to question Rockefeller regarding some newly 
released information including his gifts and loans to public officials and his 
involvement with the Goldberg book; House hearings began in late 
November and concluded after the Thanksgiving recess.74  Some suggested 
that Rockefeller’s confirmation should be deferred until the new Congress 
met in January, 1975, but Albert rejected that request.75  Ultimately, 
Rockefeller was confirmed 90 to 7 in the Senate,76 and 287 to 128 in the 
 
 67. James Cannon, Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A. Rockefeller:  A Vice Presidential 
Memoir, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE:  THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
135, 139 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997). 
 68. See FEERICK, supra note 48, at 169–70. 
 69. See id. at 172–73. 
 70. See id. at 174–75. 
 71. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 146 (statement of John D. Feerick, scholar on 
presidential succession); see also Editorial, Rockefeller Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1974, 
at 18E (arguing that “lengthy” proceedings were justified if they produced a “higher standard 
of ethical conduct” for public officials). See generally FEERICK, supra note 48, at 166–84 
(describing the Rockefeller confirmation process). 
 72. See Rockefeller Support Fell in September, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1974, 
at 21. 
 73. Linda Charlton, Goldwater Now Undecided on Rockefeller Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 1974, at 1. 
 74. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 176–82. 
 75. See Linda Charlton, Rockefeller Vote Faces Delay Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1974, 
at 27. 
 76. Three conservative Republicans—Senators Barry M. Goldwater (Arizona), Jesse 
Helms (North Carolina), and William Scott (Virginia)—and four liberal Democrats—James 
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House.77  A coalition of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats 
opposed Rockefeller.78  House Democrats voted to confirm Rockefeller 134 
to 99; House Republicans did so, 153 to 29.79  Rockefeller praised Congress 
for its “thoroughness” in acting as a surrogate for the American people, 
which he said spoke to the Constitution’s “enduring strength and vitality.”80 
Republican Minority Leader Senator Hugh Scott commended the operation 
of the Amendment.81 
The success of the Ford and Rockefeller experiences, of course, carries 
no guarantee that Section 2 will always work well.  Shortcomings could 
occur in two opposite directions.  Congress, particularly if controlled by the 
opposite party from the President, could use the Section 2 process to score 
political points rather than act expeditiously to fill the vacancy as intended.  
In the Senate, the filibuster would allow this sort of partisan abuse even by 
a substantial group from the minority party.  And members of the 
president’s own party might act to prevent the promotion to Vice President 
of a rival within their own party.  Although confirmation in a highly visible 
process would seem likely to encourage the nomination of highly 
credentialed and respected figures, it is possible to imagine these sorts of 
pressures inducing a President to bypass presidential figures. 
Alternatively, Congress might be too deferential in reviewing a nominee.  
This danger would seem most likely to occur if the vacancy arose from 
some national trauma, such as the succession of a Vice President following 
a presidential assassination.  Inasmuch as Section 2 was conceived 
following the assassination of President Kennedy, Congress had that 
contingency very much in mind.  The aftermath of tragedy might also lead a 
new President to make an improvident selection, for instance by nominating 
the spouse or family member of the deceased President. 
The possibility of unhappy outcomes does not, however, distinguish 
Section 2 from any other procedure that depends on human implementation.  
Yet the track record from the Ford and Rockefeller confirmations provides 
reason for optimism.  In each case, a President nominated a well-respected 
person who was among the leading political figures of his generation.  In 
each case, the nominee was confirmed with a minimum of partisan delay 
even though the opposition party controlled both houses of Congress.  That 
one nominator was facing likely impeachment proceedings and the other 
had himself achieved office through Section 2 did not preclude them from 
having their nominees considered and confirmed.  These successful 
implementations should help establish norms to govern subsequent uses. 
 
Abourezk (South Dakota), Birch Bayh (Indiana), Howard Metzenbaum (Ohio), and Gaylord 
Nelson (Wisconsin)—voted against Rockefeller. Linda Charlton, Ford is Pleased, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1974, at 1. 
 77. Linda Charlton, Rockefeller Sworn in as Vice President After Confirmation by 
House, 287 to 128, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1974, at 1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Transcript of Senate Inaugural Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1974, at 16. 
 81. Id. 
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In addition to functioning well, Section 2 greatly strengthened 
arrangements to assure presidential continuity.  By providing a mechanism 
to fill a vice presidential vacancy, Section 2 diminished the significance of 
the line of successors after the Vice President.  During the 178 years before 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified, the Vice Presidency was vacant, 
and accordingly, a legislative leader or Cabinet officer stood first in line of 
succession for thirty-seven of those years or twenty-one percent of the 
time.82  During the forty-three years since it has been in effect, someone 
other than the Vice President has been the first successor for only about one 
percent of the time.83 
Of course, all of that reduction cannot be traced to Section 2.  Perhaps a 
more accurate measure of the impact of Section 2 comes from looking 
simply at the presidential term from January 20, 1973 to January 20, 1977 
during which both implementations of Section 2 occurred.  Without Section 
2, the Vice Presidency would have been vacant for thirty-nine months 
instead of six months, nearly an eighty-five percent reduction.  That 
presidential term was, of course, an anomaly since it was the only time 
when two vacancies occurred in one term.  Had Nixon completed his term, 
the period of vice presidential vacancy would have shrunk from thirty-nine 
months to two months, a ninety-five percent reduction. 
Finally, a third measure of the anticipated impact of Section 2 might 
involve applying an average expected vacancy period under Section 2 
retrospectively across American history.  If one assumes that filling a vice 
presidential vacancy will normally require three months, the average of the 
Ford and Rockefeller experiences, Section 2, had it been in place since 1789 
would have allowed filling the Vice Presidency all but four years, instead of 
nearly thirty-eight, a reduction of nearly ninety percent.  Under any 
measure, Section 2 greatly minimizes the defects of alternative lines of 
succession by making much more remote the chance they will be used. 
3.  Presidential Inability 
The history under the inability provisions, though not without some 
controversy, also reflects successful resort to Section 3 and some positive 
developments regarding it and Section 4.  Presidential power has been 
transferred on three occasions under Section 3 when Presidents underwent 
medical procedures under anesthesia.  President Reagan transferred power 
to Vice President Bush for about eight hours on July 13, 1985 when he 
underwent surgery to remove a cancerous polyp from his intestine.84  
Reagan, Bush, and other top officials had discussed the possibility of a 
 
 82. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 316. 
 83. During this forty-three year period, the Vice Presidency has been vacant for only six 
months:  almost two months during Ford’s confirmation as Vice President and just over four 
months relating to Rockefeller’s nomination and confirmation. See FEERICK, supra note 48, 
at 215, 255, app. D.II. 
 84. FEERICK, supra note 48, at xv–xvi. 
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transfer during the week leading up to Reagan’s surgery.85  Reagan did not 
wish to set a precedent that would bind his successors when they underwent 
surgery under anesthesia.86  Although the letter Reagan signed obfuscated 
what legal norm authorized the transfer, Section 3 provided the only basis 
for action, he followed its procedures perfectly,87 and he and his close 
associates later acknowledged it as the basis for his action.88  Reagan may 
have reclaimed power too soon, and there has been some suggestion that he 
may have approved important overtures incident to the Iran-Contra debacle 
while in the hospital a few days after the surgery.89  Reagan certainly could, 
and should have done a better job implementing Section 3, but he at least 
deserves some credit for transferring presidential powers and duties.  
President George W. Bush twice transferred power to Vice President Dick 
Cheney under Section 3 during brief periods when he was undergoing or 
recovering from minor surgery.90 
On at least two other occasions, Presidents were prepared to delegate 
their power under Section 3 incident to anticipated anesthesia.  In May 
1991, George H.W. Bush planned to transfer powers to Vice President Dan 
Quayle when it appeared that he would have a procedure under anesthesia 
to shock his heart back into its normal rhythm.91  Medicine brought Bush’s 
heart back to its normal rhythm, thereby averting the transfer.92 
 
 85. MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 7–8 (1988), available at 
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When President Clinton had knee surgery in March 1997, his doctors 
avoided general anesthesia and administered an epidural that only affected 
the lower part of his body.93  At that time, press secretary Mike McCurry 
announced, “We have a procedure that is in place and a plan if anything 
about the 25th Amendment is indicated.”94  McCurry said that Chief of 
Staff Erskine Bowles had been in close contact with Vice President Gore’s 
staff and that “it would be irresponsible for us not to at least anticipate that 
situation.  If that need arises, we can very quickly act—deal with the 
situation, but that’s not anticipated at this time.”95  White House physician 
Dr. E. Connie Mariano had recommended that Section 3 be invoked if a 
general anesthesia was used.96 
On at least two other occasions a President or those close to him have 
contemplated the use of Section 3 or perhaps Section 4.  When Reagan was 
shot on March 30, 1981, two different groups of aides thought about 
whether to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Reagan’s triumvirate, 
consisting of chief of staff James Baker, counselor Edwin Meese, and 
deputy chief of staff Mike Deaver, were with Reagan at the hospital and 
decided not to transfer power.97  White House counsel Fred Fielding had 
papers to effectuate a transfer related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
available in the White House Situation Room, where some of the central 
Cabinet figures had gathered.98  Attorney General William French Smith, a 
close friend of Reagan’s, and Fielding briefed those in the Situation Room 
about the provision.99  Another aide, Richard Darman, confiscated the 
papers from Fielding and reported that action to James Baker who approved 
it.100  Ultimately, Baker, Meese, and Deaver decided against invoking the 
Amendment, and no one else acted to force the issue. 
The episode produced some troubling events regarding the disability 
provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Reagan was clearly unable to 
discharge his powers and duties from the time he was wounded and rapidly 
losing blood until sometime after he came out of recovery following 
surgery under anesthesia.  There was some reason to fear the Soviet Union 
might try to exploit the situation to invade Poland.101  Moreover, the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment vests constitutional power in the Vice President 
and principal heads of the executive departments, not in a triumvirate of 
 
 93. Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec’y, & David Wade, M.D., Press Briefing at 
the National Naval Medical Center, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 14, 1997),  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48584&st=surgery&st1=. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. E. Connie Mariano, In Sickness and in Health:  Medical Care for the President of 
the United States, in MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 83, 93 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000). 
 97. ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 180. 
 98. JAMES A. BAKER, III WITH STEVE FIFFER, WORK HARD, STUDY . . . AND KEEP OUT OF 
POLITICS!  ADVENTURES AND LESSONS FROM AN UNEXPECTED PUBLIC LIFE 146 (2006); 
FEERICK, supra note 48, at xiii. 
 99. ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 180. 
 100. BAKER, supra note 98, at 146. 
 101. See ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 40–41, 100–02. 
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White House aides accountable only to the President.  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment should have been invoked. 
As a practical matter, three factors justify somewhat softening criticism 
of the administration’s handling of the episode.  First, Vice President Bush 
was on Air Force Two en route from Texas to Washington, D.C. during 
much of the time Reagan was unconscious.102  The communications with 
his aircraft were apparently difficult and not secure.  It is not at all clear that 
transferring power to the Vice President while he was en route under those 
circumstances would have enhanced national security.  Shortly after Bush 
arrived at the White House, Reagan emerged from surgery.  The completion 
of the surgery did not effectively end the period of time during which a 
transfer of presidential powers might have been appropriate.  Having 
undergone the trauma of the shooting and surgery, experiencing the 
disorientation associated with the accompanying regime of medicine, and 
suffering subsequent infection and significant fever, Reagan’s capacity to 
act as President was surely compromised for some period of time.  He 
remained in the hospital for twelve days and did not return to the Oval 
Office for three and a half weeks.103  Once Reagan regained consciousness, 
however, his close associates may have plausibly concluded that a 
temporary transfer of powers could be accomplished when, and if, needed. 
Second, the Reagan assassination attempt constituted the first occasion 
when decision makers seriously contemplated invoking the disability 
provisions due to presidential injury or sudden illness.  There were no 
precedents to guide them.  The issue was unanticipated and it arose amidst a 
host of other concerns, both personal and professional. 
These circumstances interacted with a third complicating factor—the 
assassination attempt occurred early in the administration before it was 
prepared to respond.  There were at least two problems.  The administration 
had not considered how to handle various contingencies relating to the 
president’s health.  White House counsel Fred Fielding was preparing, but 
had not finished, a manual regarding the subject.  When he briefed Cabinet 
officers regarding the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in the Situation Room, 
Fielding “could see eyes glazing over” among officials who were ignorant 
of the Amendment.104 
Moreover, the assassination attempt occurred before relationships had 
solidified and before central figures had developed mutual credibility.  
Divisions existed between longtime Reagan loyalists and those identified 
with Vice President Bush and his close friend (but also Reagan’s surprise 
choice as Chief of Staff) James Baker.  Long-time Reagan supporters were 
suspicious of Bush, Baker, and others who had not initially supported 
 
 102. See id. at 83–84; ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT:  REALISM, REAGAN AND 
FOREIGN POLICY 151–52 (1984). 
 103. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 57–74 (summarizing Reagan’s schedule). 
 104. See MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 85, at App. C (quoting Fielding’s 
testimony). 
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Reagan.105  These figures, in turn, were anxious to demonstrate their 
loyalty.  Those on all sides acted more cautiously and more hesitantly than 
they might have had the episode occurred later in Reagan’s Presidency. 
High ranking presidential advisers briefly considered the disability 
provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1987 when Howard Baker 
replaced Donald Regan as Reagan’s third Chief of Staff.  Baker was 
advised, based on interviews with White House aides, that consideration 
should be given to whether Reagan was able to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office.106  These aides claimed Reagan was inattentive and 
disengaged and spent his time watching television and movies in the 
residence rather than working in the Oval Office.107  Baker was dubious 
about these reports; after meeting Reagan and seeing him in action, Baker 
and his associates concluded that Reagan was able to act as President.108 
Despite Reagan’s reluctance to establish a precedent, since 1985 
administrations have followed a practice of transferring presidential powers 
and duties to the Vice President whenever the President undergoes a 
medical procedure under anesthesia.  Two different administrations have 
done so and two others were prepared to do so.  This practice seems a 
prudent safeguard of the nation’s security.109 
The more difficult problems relate to situations in which Section 4 might 
be considered.  These fall into two general categories—situations in which 
a President is unconscious due to a sudden injury or illness and situations in 
which a President is or may be no longer physically or mentally able to 
discharge presidential functions yet denies that incapacity.  The 
unconscious President scenario presents a clear case in which to transfer 
power.  A Vice President is unlikely to take dramatic steps while acting as 
President for a short time absent an emergency,110 yet it would seem more 
prudent for presidential powers and duties to be transferred from a 
comatose to a conscious figure.  The common sense of this conclusion may 
 
 105. See BAKER, supra note 98, at 145–46; see also JULES WITCOVER, FROM ADAMS AND 
JEFFERSON TO TRUMAN AND QUAYLE:  CRAPSHOOT—ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE 
PRESIDENCY:  FROM ADAMS AND JEFFERSON TO TRUMAN AND QUAYLE 319–20 (1992). 
 106. JANE MAYER & DOYLE MCMANUS, LANDSLIDE:  THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 
1984–1988, at x (1988). 
 107. Id. at ix. 
 108. Id. at x–xi; Interview by Stephen Knott et al. with Howard Baker, former Reagan 
Chief of Staff, in Wash., D.C., 3–4 (Aug. 24, 2004) (on file with the Miller Center of Public 
Affairs, Ronald Reagan Oral History Project), available at http://web1.millercenter.org/
poh/transcripts/ohp_2004_0824_baker.pdf. 
 109. Quite clearly, some issues regarding presidential inability remain to be considered.  
Could the provisions have been used, as some have suggested, for Presidents Richard M. 
Nixon or William J. Clinton to have transferred powers during their impeachment 
proceedings?  Although the Amendment clearly was not designed as a political no-
confidence remedy, presumably Section 3 could be used by a President who found that the 
stress of defending against removal precluded him or her from discharging the executive 
power, unlikely as that scenario is.  For discussions of the range of possible applications, see 
FEERICK, supra note 48, at 197–200; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 98–102. 
 110. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  The 
Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 96, at 165, 198–201. 
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sometimes yield to other considerations.  If the President could have, but 
did not, transfer power under Section 3 before losing consciousness, the 
Vice President and Cabinet may hesitate to invoke Section 4.  If the loss of 
consciousness is brief, the Cabinet may not have time to act.  Having not 
transferred power while the President was unconscious, it may be difficult 
to do so once the President wakes up even though there may be a period 
before the President can truly resume the powers and duties of the office. 
The mishandling of disability issues incident to the Reagan assassination 
attempt focused attention on some of those issues and some remedial 
actions have been taken.  Administrations now have contingency plans in 
place and White House counsels, presidential physicians, and other 
important personnel are schooled in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
President George H.W. Bush met with Vice President Dan Quayle and 
other interested parties in April 1989, early in their term, to discuss the 
matter and responses to possible disability scenarios.111  Their successors 
have also taken positive steps.112  Each administration should adopt 
appropriate contingency plans prior to inauguration and make sure central 
figures are familiar with them.  Moreover, Presidents need to make clear, to 
the Vice President, Cabinet members, key White House aides, and their 
families, their wish that powers and duties should be transferred to the Vice 
President when the President is unable to exercise presidential powers and 
duties. 
The most difficult predicament, from a medical and political perspective, 
arises when a President clings to power despite being disabled.  No 
procedure can guarantee results here.113  Alternative approaches carry their 
own risks.  For reasons discussed below, the architects of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment designed Sections 3 and 4 as they did, and they provide a 
foundation to address this inherently complicated problem. 
II.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment offers more than the sum of its provisions.  
In addition to the rules and procedures it provides, its design and history 
should shape discussion of further reform in two distinct ways.  First, a 
number of constitutional principles animated, and are implicit in, its 
provisions.  As such, it introduces certain ideas into the structure of the 
Constitution and reinforces (or mitigates) others.  Moreover, the story of the 
Amendment offers strategic and tactical lessons regarding how to achieve 
meaningful reform regarding presidential continuity.  Ratification of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not serendipitous.  It was accomplished due 
 
 111. FITZWATER, supra note 91, at 286; DAN QUAYLE, STANDING FIRM:  A VICE-
PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 251–52 (1994). 
 112. See, e.g., Mariano, supra note 96, at 92–93. 
 113. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY:  ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 277–78 (2d ed. 1998) (suggesting that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is 
unlikely to handle well many psychological illnesses); GEORGE E. REEDY, THE TWILIGHT OF 
THE PRESIDENCY 160–70 (1970) (discussing the difficulty of handling a psychologically 
disturbed President). 
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to wise choices its architects made.  Even though the modern context 
introduces some novel considerations, the story of the Amendment offers 
valuable lessons regarding achieving reform in a difficult area. 
Accordingly, studying the principles and choices that provided the 
foundation for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment serves a retrospective and a 
prospective purpose.  Looking backward, a review provides insight into the 
ideas and objectives of the Amendment and the constraints and choices its 
proponents made.  Looking forward, such a study may help address 
remaining problems, both by suggesting constitutional principles which 
may inform the effort as well as presenting lessons regarding legislative 
strategy which may enhance prospects of success for future reform efforts.  
The retrospective survey confirms that the framers of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment struck prudent balances among basic, yet often competing, 
principles and achieved success through skillful political behavior.  The 
prospective discussion suggests that some of these principles might prove 
helpful in addressing remaining problems. 
A.  Constitutional Principles 
1.  Presidential Continuity 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflected the conviction that having a 
functioning Chief Executive at all times is mandatory.  That commitment 
flowed from the Constitution’s vesting of the executive power in a 
President of the United States114 and from historical change that had 
increased the importance of that office in a nuclear age.  “There can be no 
doubt in anybody’s mind that this Nation cannot permit the Office of the 
President to be vacant even for a moment,”115 said Representative Emanuel 
Celler.  Those who drafted the Twenty-Fifth Amendment urged that 
resolution of issues relating to presidential inability was “imperative if 
continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of 
turbulence at times when a President is disabled.  Continuity of executive 
authority is more important today than ever before” due to the increased 
importance of the Presidency.116 
 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”). 
 115. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Celler); see also id. at 3 
(statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch) (referring to the constant need for “capable, 
dynamic, and certain leadership” from the President); 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) 
(statement of Rep. Celler) (“We are thus assured of the continuity of Executive authority, 
which is highly important, the continuity of Executive authority.”); id. at 7954 (statement of 
Rep. Don Fuqua) (“More important than ever before is the continuity of the powers of the 
Executive Office and it is imperative that this continuity be maintained with the least 
possible disturbance at the time of a President’s disability.”). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 8 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 8 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-
1382, at 6 (1964); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7942 (1965) (statement of Rep. William M. 
McCulloch) (speaking of the increased importance of executive continuity); id. at 7956 
(statement of Rep. William Randall) (discussing the importance of presidential continuity); 
id. at 7957 (statement of Rep. Herbert Tenzer) (discussing importance of Presidency); id. at 
3168 (statement  of Sen. George Smathers); id. at 3264 (statement of Sen. Hugh Scott). 
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“Continuity of executive authority” was used in two different senses.  
Most basically, it meant that there should always be someone authorized to 
exercise presidential powers and duties and capable of doing so.117  In an 
age in which “it is possible to destroy civilization as we know it in a manner 
of minutes,” national security “demands a President who is always capable 
of making rational decisions and rational determinations.”118  The 
Amendment pursued this objective by establishing a means to transfer 
power and duties from a disabled President to a Vice President and by 
providing a mechanism to fill the Vice Presidency whenever it fell vacant.  
Although Sections 3 and 4 reflected a bias in favor of a President’s 
entitlement to the office to which she was elected, the belief in the 
importance of presidential continuity was sufficiently strong that Section 4 
allowed the Vice President to continue to act as President during the period 
in which the Vice President and Cabinet decided to challenge her 
declaration of fitness and during the period in which Congress had to 
referee a dispute.119 
Yet the framers of the Amendment were not indifferent regarding who 
the presidential pinch hitter should be.  They associated “continuity of 
executive authority” with certain qualities they identified with the Vice 
President.  Accordingly, they concluded it was essential to have a Vice 
President “at all times.”120  Section 2 would “assure that the person 
nominated was a member of the President’s own party, of compatible 
temperament and views, and someone with whom [the President] could 
work effectively.”121 
a.  A Prepared Successor 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment identified the Vice President as the 
optimal first successor for three interrelated reasons.  It saw the Vice 
 
 117. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 40 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (emphasizing the 
importance of executive continuity); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 214 (statement 
of Clinton Rossiter, Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University) (“Perhaps the 
most pressing requirement of good Government in the United States today is an 
uninterrupted, unchallengeable exercise of the full authority of the Presidency.  We need a 
man in the Presidency at all times who is capable of exercising this authority, and we need 
one, moreover, whose claim to that authority is undoubted.”). 
 118. 110 CONG. REC. 22,990 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see 1965 House Hearings, 
supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (rejecting permissibility of gap in 
presidential power in “space age”); 111 CONG. REC. 7951 (1965) (statement of Rep. William 
Cahill) (“In this day and age with immediate decisions required on a myriad of subjects, it is 
inconceivable that this country should continue without the full service of a chief 
executive.”); 110 CONG. REC. 23,060 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 22,994 
(statement of Sen. Alan Bible).  
 119. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Its Origins and History, in 
MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra 
note 96, at 1, 14–15. 
 120. 111 CONG. REC. 3252 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); Memorandum from John D. 
Feerick, scholar on presidential succession, to Sen. Birch Bayh, Section 2 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment (Sept. 24, 1973) in Selected Materials on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, S. 
DOC. NO. 93-42, at 279, 281 (1973) [hereinafter Feerick Memorandum]. 
 121. Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 281. 
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President as well suited to function in an understudy role.  This experience 
would position the Vice President “to become familiar with the problems he 
will face should he be called upon to act as President.”122  Succession of a 
Vice President would allow “no break in the informed exercise of executive 
authority” in the event of tragedy.123  The Vice President could assume the 
Presidency “on a moment’s notice.”124  Someone who held another office 
would be hard-pressed to achieve the desired familiarity that the understudy 
role could offer while discharging duties attached to another demanding 
position. 
b.  Harmony Breeds Preparation 
The framers thought it essential that the successor be someone with 
whom the President could work well.125  Such a harmonious relationship 
between the President and Vice President would protect the operation of the 
executive branch and would encourage vice presidential involvement.  The 
Vice President, as someone who was chosen by the President,126 would be 
more likely to receive confidential information from the President than 
someone outside the Administration.127 
 
 122. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 11–12 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 11–12 (1965); S. REP. 
NO. 88-1382, at 10 (1964); see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 26 (statement of 
Sen. Kenneth Keating) (noting impediments to the Speaker serving as understudy); 111 
CONG. REC. 7953 (1965) (statement of Rep. Jacob H. Gilbert) (discussing need for 
“presidential successor fully conversant with domestic and world affairs” and prepared for 
succession “on short notice”); 110 CONG. REC. 23,059 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 
22,996 (Vice President in “training”); John D. Feerick, The Vice Presidency and the Problem 
of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 489 (1964) (speaking of 
the importance of “‘on the job training’” purpose of the Vice Presidency). 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 15; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 14; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 13; 
see also 111 CONG. REC. 7949 (1965) (statement of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan) (stating that the 
Vice President must be prepared to succeed on a moment’s notice). 
 124. 111 CONG. REC. 7961–62 (1965) (statement of Rep. John V. Lindsay). 
 125. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 89 (statement of Sen. Bayh) 
(emphasizing need for harmony between the President and Vice President); 110 CONG. REC. 
23,060 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 126. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 81 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) (stating 
that the Vice President “would have the President’s full confidence”); id. at 93–95 (statement 
of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., president-elect, American Bar Association) (noting the importance 
of “harmonious relations and mutual confidence”); id. at 130–31 (statement of Paul A. 
Freund, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (noting the need for “harmony” between the 
President and Vice President); 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard 
Poff) (“[A] man originally chosen by the President . . . .”).  
 127. See, e.g., Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Cong. 11 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Nicholas deB. 
Katzenbach, acting Att’y Gen. of the United States); 111 CONG. REC. 15,591 (1965) 
(statement of Sen. Everett Dirksen) (stating the importance of a working relationship 
between the President and Vice President); id at 7941 (statement of Rep. Poff) (describing 
the Vice President as “a man who knows what great decisions of state are waiting to be made 
. . . .”); id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (stating that a close relationship between 
the President and Vice President will promote vice presidential preparation); 110 CONG. 
REC. 23,060 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 22,992 (statement of Sen. Leverett 
Saltonstall); id. at 22,993–94 (statement of Sen. Fong); id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen. 
Bible); Feerick, supra note 122, at 489. 
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c.  Party Continuity 
Finally, the Vice President was likely to be ideologically compatible with 
the President.  The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment noted that the 
“importance of this compatibility is recognized in the modern practice of 
both major political parties in according the presidential candidate a voice 
in choosing his running mate subject to convention approval” and that it 
was critical that the procedure for filling a vice presidential vacancy 
replicate that model.128  Since proposed Section 2 would allow the 
President to nominate a Vice President subject to congressional approval, 
“the country would be assured of a Vice President of the same political 
party as the President, someone who would presumably work in harmony 
with the basic policies of the President.”129  That arrangement “would 
assure a reasonable continuity of Executive policy, should the Vice 
President become President.”130  By contrast, a Speaker of the House, the 
person who was next in line, might belong to the opposite party.  “What 
implications would that have for the continuity of Executive policy?” Bayh 
asked rhetorically.131  “The people, by voting in an election, should be the 
ones to decide a change of policy and a change of direction in our 
Government, and not some illness, some assassin’s bullet, or some other 
unfortunate situation which would remove a President from the scene.”132 
Section 2’s strong emphasis on party continuity introduced an important 
concept into the Constitution.  In short, presidential succession should not 
shift party control of the executive branch.  Whereas previously this idea 
simply made good sense, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment elevated it to a 
constitutional concept. 
 
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 15; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 15; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 13. 
 129. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 15; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 15; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 13.  
This language borrowed from the testimony of former Attorney General Herbert Brownell 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in 1964. See 1964 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 6, at 137–38; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 245 
(statement of Herbert Brownell, former Att’y Gen. of the United States); 1965 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 127, at 45 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 1964 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 6, at 26 (statement of Sen. Keating) (noting the importance of party continuity 
and the possibility of a Speaker from the other party); id. at 28 (criticizing proposal for 
congressional election of the Vice President due to the possibility of cross-party result); 111 
CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (“The Vice President, a man of the same 
political party . . . .”); id. at 7953 (statement of Rep. Gilbert) (discussing the importance of 
the Vice President having “harmonious relations and mutual confidences” with the 
President); id. at 7954 (statement of Rep. Fuqua) (discussing the increased importance of the 
relationship between the President and Vice President); id. at 7962 (statement of Rep. 
McCulloch) (criticizing proposal for special election for the Vice President which might 
choose a member of the opposition party); id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Fong) (noting the 
importance of party identity between the President and Vice President); 110 CONG. REC. 
22,992 (1964) (statement of Sen. Saltonstall); id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 130. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 111 CONG. 
REC. 3256 (1965) (statements of Sens. Samuel Ervin, Jr. and Bayh). 
 131. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2; see also id. at 59–60, 65 (statement of Sen. 
Frank Moss); 111 CONG. REC. 7956 (1965) (statement of Rep. Randall) (calling the fact that 
Section 2 avoids succession of someone of “a different political faith” “one of the strong 
arguments” in its favor). 
 132. 110 CONG. REC. 22,988 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
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2.  A Presidential Vice President 
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought that the Vice 
President needed to be a presidential figure.  They attributed to the founders 
the intent that the Vice President be a person “equal in stature to the 
President” and someone who was “qualified and able” to be President.133  
They shared that aspiration for the caliber of Vice Presidents and thought 
the recent development of the office had brought it to that standard.134  
They rejected the proposal to create a second Vice President in part because 
they thought it would attract people whose qualifications were insufficient 
to be a heartbeat or two from the Presidency.135  The prime qualification to 
be Vice President, Bayh said, was fitness to be President.136  The Vice 
President should be “the best possible man to serve in that post.”137  
Presidential scholar Clinton Rossiter thought the President would have “a 
clear burden” to choose someone “of the highest stature and abilities.”138  
Congressional confirmation would furnish “an added safeguard that only 
fully qualified persons of the highest character and national stature” would 
be nominated to be Vice President.139 
3.  A New Vice Presidential Vision 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was premised on and reflected a new 
appreciation of the Vice Presidency as it was then perceived.140  Its text 
manifested this new attitude.  Section 2 provided a method to fill a vice 
presidential vacancy to substantially reduce periods when that position was 
unoccupied. That innovation was a striking departure from the original 
Constitution, which viewed the Vice President primarily as an expedient to 
facilitate the presidential election system but as superfluous once that 
mission was completed.141  Moreover, Sections 3 and 4 made the Vice 
President a necessary participant in disability determinations. 
Numerous comments during hearings and floor debates underscored this 
new appreciation of the Vice Presidency.142  Those who framed the 
 
 133. S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 8–9. 
 134. See id. 
 135. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (arguing that two 
Vice Presidents would “invite men of small political stature and questionable 
qualifications”). 
 136. 110 CONG. REC. 22,987 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 137. Id. at 22,996 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, 
at 90 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (predicting the President would have the incentive “to get the 
very best possible man”); id. at 91 (stating the electorate would insist on an “extremely well 
qualified” Vice President); id. at 256 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (stating the 
President would have “very strong self-interest” to choose “the best possible man”).   
 138. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 218 (statement of Professor Rossiter).   
 139. 111 CONG. REC. 7955 (1965) (statement of Rep. Peter Rodino). 
 140. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 505, 508 (1995); see Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 279 (“In recognition of 
the growing importance of the Vice Presidency . . . .”).  
 141. See Goldstein, supra note 140, at 511–13. 
 142. See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Bayh) 
(arguing for the need for a Vice President at all times and broad consensus to that effect). 
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Amendment saw the Vice Presidency as a useful institution in the executive 
branch.  They believed the officer, if utilized by the President, could 
enhance the operation of that branch.143  They recognized that Presidents 
had discretion whether, and how much, to involve their Vice Presidents.  
They reasoned that Presidents would be most likely to involve the Vice 
President if the two were compatible and were bound together by feelings 
of loyalty and responsibility.  To nurture those attitudes, they provided that 
the President would nominate the Vice President subject to approval by 
each house of Congress, thereby simulating the selection process whereby 
the party standard bearer chooses the running mate.144 
They saw the development of the Vice Presidency as a virtue in 
American government, one which should be protected.  Accordingly, they 
rejected the proposal of Senator Kenneth Keating to create two Vice 
Presidents, a reform many thought would check the growth of the office in 
addition to presenting other problems.145  The design of Section 4 also 
reflected a concern for the Vice President; the addition of the Cabinet as a 
partner in disability determinations was largely motivated by a desire to 
protect the Vice President from the perception that he or she was trying to 
usurp power. 
Section 2 rested on the promise that the Vice President was the optimal 
presidential successor.  The Kennedy assassination and Johnson succession 
“pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the executive branch when 
there is no incumbent Vice President.”146  On sixteen occasions, then 
totaling more than thirty-seven years, the Vice Presidency had been vacant.  
“In any one of those years something could have happened to the President.  
This would have required an officer other than the Vice President to act as 
President,”147 said Bayh in his opening remarks at the 1964 hearings to 
consider proposed constitutional amendments two months after the 
Kennedy assassination.  The implication was clear: it was better if 
succession did not extend beyond the Vice President.  Section 2 was 
designed to address the problem of presidential succession after the Vice 
President by minimizing the instances when someone other than a Vice 
President would stand a heartbeat from the Presidency.  It sought to route 
succession away from those other than the Vice President by creating a 
mechanism to fill that position.  The Committee Reports that accompanied 
the legislation in both houses confessed that “Section 2 is intended to 
virtually assure us that the Nation will always possess a Vice President.”148  
 
 143. Id. at 2–3. 
 144. See id. at 4. 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 245–46 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, former Vice President of the 
United States); Feerick, supra note 122, at 470. 
 146. S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 9 (1964). 
 147. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1. 
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 14 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 14 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-
1382, at 13; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 217 (statement of Professor 
Rossiter) (“I think that we should go against this problem today and solve it, except in the 
most ghastly and unforeseen of circumstances, by providing a dignified, open and conclusive 
means of filling the Vice Presidency whenever it has been vacated.”). 
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As President Johnson said in his Message to Congress, “[i]n these times” 
the statutory line of succession was “no substitute for an office of 
succession.”149 
4.  Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances 
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment adopted solutions that 
incorporated basic principles of separation of powers and checks and 
balances.  The commitment to separation of powers ideas, which 
emphasize, in part, protection of institutional boundaries, was primary.150  
Concerns relating to checks and balances, which focus on limiting 
governmental power and promoting governmental accountability, were 
secondary. 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment rested on the premise that solutions to 
continuity problems should respect the institutional integrity of the 
executive branch and protect the President.  As such, it prevented Congress 
from imposing a Vice President the President did not want and it structured 
inability procedures to create a substantial presumption in favor of the 
President’s entitlement to his office. 
Separation of powers ideas influenced the approach to filling a vice 
presidential vacancy.  Although nominally the Vice President was President 
of the Senate, the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment recognized that 
the Vice President had increasingly become an executive official, a role 
they repeatedly emphasized.151  Accordingly, the framers gave the 
President the sole power to nominate the Vice President.  They rejected 
approaches that would have allowed Congress to elect a Vice President or 
choose from a slate of nominees.152  Congress should not be able to impose 
on the President an unwanted Vice President. 
Similarly, they devised methods for handling presidential inability that 
were extremely sensitive to the institutional integrity of the executive 
branch generally and to the particular interests of the President.  Only 
members of the executive branch could initiate a transfer of power—the 
President, under the voluntary transfer process of Section 3, and the Vice 
President and Cabinet, under the involuntary procedures of Section 4.  
Section 4 was crafted so that “no door is opened for undue pressure on the 
executive branch” from other branches of government,153 explained Herbert 
Brownell, whose ideas influenced the Amendment.  Testifying for the 
American Bar Association (ABA), Lewis Powell, Jr., its president-elect, 
 
 149. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 
1 PUB. PAPERS 100, 102 (Jan. 28, 1965). 
 150. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241, 253 (statement of former Att’y 
Gen. Brownell); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4–5, 66 (statement of Sen. Bayh); 
id. at 70–71 (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska); id. at 133–34 (statement of Professor 
Freund); 111 CONG. REC. 3269 (1965) (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska). 
 151. See Goldstein, supra note 140, at 529–32. 
 152. See Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 280. 
 153. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241 (statement of former Att’y Gen. 
Brownell); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7952 (1965) (statement of Rep. Byron Rogers) (Cabinet 
will be “hesitant” to declare the President disabled); BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 279. 
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thought that the “independence of the executive branch must be preserved, 
and a President who has regained his health should not be harassed by a 
possibly hostile Congress.”154  Although Congress could replace the 
Cabinet with some other body,155 until it did, only presidential appointees 
could displace the Chief Executive.  “[W]e must take every precaution to 
safeguard the President from unwarranted usurpation of his power,” said 
Bayh.156  “The point” behind the disability provisions was “to safeguard the 
President—to give him every advantage in any action or contemplated 
action.”157 
Even if Congress replaced the Cabinet with some other body, the Vice 
President remained a crucial actor under Section 4, thereby giving one 
executive officer an effective veto in any event.  Indeed, the Senate-House 
conference added language “to make crystal clear that the Vice President 
must be a party to any action declaring the President unable to perform his 
powers and duties.”158  The design was intended to protect the President 
from the threat of “unwarranted usurpation of his power” by assigning the 
primary roles to the President and his close political allies; Congress could 
intervene only to resolve an irreconcilable dispute in the executive 
branch.159  Section 4 required that the House and Senate adjudicate a 
 
 154. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 93; see also id. at 152 (statement of Feerick, 
scholar of presidential succession).  The position of Senator Eugene McCarthy that Congress 
should be able to initiate an inability determination was rejected. 111 CONG. REC. 15,586 
(1965) (statement of Sen. Eugene McCarthy); id. at 15,383; see also id. at 15,590 (statement 
of Sen. Ervin) (reporting his initial view, now changed, that Congress should initiate an 
inability determination). 
 155. Such a change would, of course, be subject to a presidential veto in which case the 
“other body” would only supersede the Cabinet if each house overrode the president’s veto 
by a two-thirds majority vote. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have 
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be 
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he 
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall 
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.  If after such 
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together 
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if 
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.  But in all such Cases the 
Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons 
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.  If 
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it 
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had 
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall 
not be a Law.”). 
 156. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 157. Id. at 4–5. 
 158. 111 CONG. REC. 15,379 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).  Ironically, the Senator 
most troubled by that addition was Albert Gore, Sr., father of a subsequent Vice President. 
See also id. at 15,383–84 (stating the Vice President is a necessary actor under Section 4 
with the Cabinet or other body Congress creates). But see id. at 15,586 (statement of Sen. 
McCarthy) (arguing that the Vice President should have been excluded); id. at 15,588 
(statement of Sen. Albert Gore) (labeling the participation of the Vice President in an 
inability determination “to say the least, debatable”); id. at 15,590 (statement of Sen. Ervin) 
(reporting his prior view that the Vice President should not be involved). 
 159. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4–5 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“In the 
question of Presidential inability, we must take every precaution to safeguard the President 
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disability dispute within twenty-one days; the time limit was imposed “to 
place a safeguard around the President.”160  Finally, the Amendment 
incorporated the requirement that each house of Congress conclude by a 
supermajority vote that the President was unable to perform the powers and 
duties of his office.  Unless each house agreed that he was disabled within 
the twenty-one day period, the President was entitled to resume the exercise 
of those functions.161 
In reserving to members of the executive branch the exclusive right to 
initiate a transfer of presidential power under Sections 3 and 4, the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment ran the risk that the President’s allies might conceal a 
disability.  Its authors believed that course posed a lesser danger than a 
regime that would allow Congress to wield a disability determination as a 
weapon against the executive branch.  This resolution reflected a bias in 
favor of protecting the executive branch generally, and the President 
specifically, from legislative intrusion in this matter.  It also represented a 
judgment that executive officials would be most likely to recognize 
presidential inability and transfer power if they were authorized to initiate 
the process and determine when the disability had ended.  Thus, a President 
who voluntarily transferred power under Section 3 could reclaim it 
immediately without review.162  And the Cabinet was associated with the 
Vice President in Section 4 to provide some political cover for someone 
history suggested would otherwise be reluctant to initiate a disability 
determination.163  The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
emphatically rejected a medical commission in part because they thought a 
 
from unwarranted usurpation of his power. . . . The point of this is to safeguard the 
President—to give him every advantage in any action or contemplated action.”).  The 
framers rejected the approach proposed by Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. to have Congress initiate 
and decide inability through a procedure like that of impeachment. See 1964 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 6, at 254–56 (describing Sen. Ervin’s approach); see also 111 CONG. 
REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“Throughout all these sections are thrown in 
that if there is any doubt the President is favored without doubt.  The resolution shall always 
be in favor of the President because he is the elected representative of the people, the first 
officer of the land, and he shall be favored without doubt.”); 110 CONG. REC. 22,995 (1964) 
(statement of Sen. Bible).  Some thought Section 4 did not go far enough to protect the 
President since it provided that in case of a dispute between the President and Vice 
President-Cabinet, the Vice President would remain in power until Congress resolved the 
matter. See 111 CONG. REC. 7948 (1965) (statement of Rep. Lindsay); id. at 7949–50 
(statement of Rep. Arch Moore); id. at 7958 (statement of  Rep. Richard C. White). 
 160. 111 CONG. REC. 15,385 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 161. Either house could unilaterally restore the President to power in a shorter period of 
time by an earlier vote to resolve the inability dispute, which did not produce a two-third 
super majority in support of the Vice President’s position. Id. at 15,379. 
 162. Language was added to Section 3 in conference to make this point explicit. See id. at 
15,378. 
 163. See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 129 (statement of Professor 
Freund) (stating the Vice President “should be spared the task of shouldering the 
responsibility alone” since “the very appearance of self-interest might impel him to refrain 
from a decision which by objective standards ought to be taken”). 
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divided vote among medical experts regarding the President’s capacity 
would degrade presidential power.164 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on separation of powers ideals, the 
framers also included checks and balances features.  A vice presidential 
nominee only took office if each house of Congress approved, thereby 
affording a check against an improvident appointment.  Significantly, they 
chose bicameral approval of a nominee by the houses of Congress instead 
of Electoral College review.165  The latter approach would have imposed no 
meaningful check since electors have become party functionaries, not 
independent discretionary actors. 
Similarly, Section 4 designated Congress the referee if the President 
contested the inability determination of the Vice President and Cabinet.166  
Congress’s role provided some check against an incapacitated President 
trying to resume power and against usurpation of the Chief Executive’s 
position by others. 
The predominance of separation of powers thinking, over that of checks 
and balances, becomes more evident when the disability provisions in 
Section 4 are contrasted with the Constitution’s impeachment arrangements.  
These two procedures are linked in offering the only constitutional 
processes to remove a President permanently from office in the case of 
impeachment, and at least temporarily from exercising the powers and 
duties, in the case of the disability. 
The two constitutional remedies follow quite different models.  Whereas 
Congress initiates and concludes presidential impeachment, with the House 
impeaching and the Senate deciding whether to convict and remove,167 
Congress is assigned a more passive role regarding presidential inability.  It 
cannot initiate a disability determination and it only has a role in the 
somewhat unlikely event that the President finds himself in an 
irreconcilable public conflict with the Vice President and Cabinet regarding 
his ability to discharge the powers and duties.  Congress’s role as umpire 
serves as a disincentive to usurpation by a Vice President and Cabinet as 
well as to the President’s improvident return.  By virtue of the bicameral 
supermajority requirement, which is a prerequisite for the Vice President 
continuing to act as President, Congress acts as a check on the Vice 
President and Cabinet more than on the President. 
 
 164. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241–42 (statement of former Att’y 
Gen. Brownell).  
 165. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 233–34. 
 166. 111 CONG. REC. 15,379 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (stating that Congress 
was reduced to “an appellate body” under Section 4); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra 
note 5, at 47 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that Congress provides a check against 
usurpation of presidential power); id. at 241 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) 
(stating that the Cabinet provides a check on the Vice President); 1964 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (discussing the importance of checks and 
balances since the President is fallible). 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their 
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.  When sitting for that 
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.”). 
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The two models diverge in another significant respect.  The conflict of 
interest concerns that inform the Impeachment provisions are absent from 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Whereas the Constitution specifically 
precludes the Vice President from presiding over the Senate when trying a 
presidential impeachment,168 it makes the Vice President a necessary 
initiator (or co-initiator) of disability decisions.  Rather than sidelining the 
Vice President, the Amendment explicitly sanctions his or her participation.  
Although the Amendment specifically allows Congress to replace the 
Cabinet as a necessary co-actor under Section 4, Congress cannot replace 
the Vice President by statute.  Indeed, the Cabinet (or other body) was 
included as much to provide cover for the Vice President against the charge 
of self-aggrandizement as to check ambitious vice presidential behavior. 
5.  Democratic Pedigree 
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought it important that 
the presidential successor have a democratic pedigree.  They were not 
prepared to allow Congress to elect the new Vice President outright, an 
approach which would have undermined the continuity, vice presidential 
vision, and separation of powers concerns.  They did seek, however, to 
introduce a democratic element into the process in a manner consistent with 
those objectives. 
They saw the submission of the nomination to the people’s 
representatives as consistent with the “democratic system” in which they 
operated.169  Confirmation by Congress would give “the people of the 
United States a voice through their elected representatives.”170  The 
inclusion of the House reflected an effort to make the confirmation process 
a surrogate for an election.171  Congress would “consider this serious 
responsibility and act as the voice of the people.”172  “What better 
opportunity is there for the people to express their wishes than through 
those who serve in Congress?” Bayh asked rhetorically.173 
They also thought that Congress’s democratic character well-positioned 
it to umpire a disability dispute between the President and Vice President.  
 
 168. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.  
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.  When the President of 
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:  And no Person shall be convicted 
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.” (emphasis added)).   
 169. 110 CONG. REC. 22,988 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 170. id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen. Bible); see also 111 CONG. REC. 3252 (1965) 
(statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 3255; 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen. 
Bayh).  
 171. See 111 CONG. REC. 3252 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (comparing bicameral 
confirmation to election); 110 CONG. REC. 22,994 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bible). 
 172. 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 173. Id.; see also id. at 23,060 (“[I]t guarantees to the people that their representatives in 
Congress, those who are most responsive to the wishes of the people at any given time, will 
be able to express the voice of those whom they represent.”). But see 111 CONG. REC. 7950 
(1965) (statement of Rep. Charles Mathias, Jr.) (criticizing Section 2 as not sufficiently 
democratic). 
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Congress was given that role “because it is believed that, as the elected 
representative of the people, they share the greatest trust of the people.”174 
6.  Accountable Decision Making 
The Amendment emphasized accountability as an important attribute in 
decision making on presidential continuity.  This ideal required that public 
officials make decisions regarding presidential continuity and that their 
actions be transparent.  These features were thought critical to producing 
public confidence in the decisions reached.175  This preference was 
particularly evident in the design of Sections 2 and 4, and, in a lesser way, 
Section 3. 
The reliance on the House and Senate, rather than the Electoral College, 
to consider a vice presidential nominee reflected the ideal that decision 
makers should be accountable public figures.  Among the disadvantages of 
the Electoral College was the fact that “[m]uch of the general public has no 
earthly idea who their State’s electors are.”176  Accordingly, the public 
“would be understandably hesitant to allow any such unknown quantity to 
make an important decision” like confirming a Vice President177 and its 
decision would not “command the requisite respect and support of the 
people.”178  Bayh thought the public “would wonder what in the world was 
being perpetrated upon them if we brought in members of the electoral 
college whom they did not know from Adam.”179 
The framers thought the Vice President and Cabinet were preferable to a 
medical commission to decide inability in part because of their 
accountability.  Similarly, they rejected the proposal of President 
Eisenhower that a high-level commission180 resolve disputes regarding the 
President’s fitness to reclaim his powers and duties.  “Commissions are not 
 
 174. 111 CONG. REC. 7943 (1965) (statement of Rep. McCulloch); see also id. at 7955 
(statement of Rep. Dante Fascell) (praising Section 4 as providing “fully democratic 
procedures and safeguards”); id. at 7957 (statement of Rep. Tenzer) (confirmation by 
Congress “would tend to create public confidence in the selection”). 
 175. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 176. Id. at 5.  
 177. Id.; see also id. at 60 (statement of Sen. Moss); 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) 
(statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 178. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 94 (statement of Powell, president-elect, 
American Bar Association); see also 110 CONG. REC. 22,994 (1964) (statement of Sen.  
Bible) (noting that the Electoral College is “not subject to the direct will of the people” 
outside an election year); Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 280 (noting that the 
Electoral College should be rejected since it would not “command the respect and support of 
the people”). 
 179. 111 CONG. REC. 3274 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).  The Senate rejected by 
voice vote an amendment offered by Senator Strom Thurmond which would use the 
Electoral College to fill a vice presidential vacancy. Id. 
 180. Eisenhower proposed that the Commission consist of three senior members of the 
Cabinet, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the President pro tempore and 
minority leader of the Senate, and “four medical personnel recognized by the American 
Medical Association as competent in their fields” who would advise the others. 1964 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 6, at 232 (statement of Sen. Bayh, quoting a letter from former 
President Eisenhower).  
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responsive, and they do not have to, of course, account to the electorate,” 
explained Nixon.181 
Even the requirement that the President notify the Speaker and President 
pro tempore of his or her inability by letter reflected a concern with 
accountability.  This method provided a transparent way to announce the 
beginning and end of a voluntary transfer of power, thereby shielding 
against a situation where a Vice President claimed authority based on a 
letter he or she generated.182 
7.  Deliberative Decision Making 
The Amendment also reflected a belief that decision making should be 
based on data and deliberation.  The Electoral College was unsuited for a 
role in considering a vice presidential nominee because, unlike Congress, it 
was not chosen “to exercise any considered judgment or reasoning.”183  It 
was not “equipped . . . to conduct hearings on the qualifications of [a] 
nominee.”184 
The Cabinet was included in disability deliberations because it was 
thought to have valuable information regarding the President.  The framers 
thought that working with the President on a regular basis would afford 
insight into his or her fitness to serve.185  Nonetheless, they clearly thought 
that a decision should be informed by medical expertise and specifically so 
stated in conspicuous places in the legislative history.186 
 
 181. Id. at 241 (statement of former Vice President Nixon). 
 182. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 53–54 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (discussing 
letters transmitted in Sections 3 and 4 to the President pro tempore of the Senate, not the 
President of Senate, to avoid the Vice President transmitting letter to himself and to avoid 
transmittal of letter to party in interest); 111 CONG. REC. 15,378 (1965) (statement of Sen. 
Bayh) (same). 
 183. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 184. Id.; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 66 (statement of Sen. Bayh) 
(stating that the extent of deliberations would be related to the identity of the vice 
presidential nominee). 
 185. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (stating that involvement of the Vice President and 
Cabinet “would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the President, both politically 
and physically, and presumably most familiar with his condition”); see H.R. REP. NO. 89-
203, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11–12 (1964) (same); see also 1965 House 
Hearings, supra note 5, at 56 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (referring to close working 
relationship between the Vice President and Cabinet); 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) 
(statement of Rep. Poff) (citing the Vice President’s and Cabinet’s knowledge of the 
President’s health); id. at 7942 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (citing Cabinet’s “intimate 
contact” with the President as reason for entrusting it with disability decision); id. at 7954 
(statement of Rep. Gilbert) (stating Section 4 “would enable prompt action by the persons 
closest to the President”); id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Fong) (noting that the President’s 
proximity to the Vice President and Cabinet equip them to assess the President’s capacity). 
 186. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (“It is assumed that such decision would be made only after 
adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar with the 
President’s physical and mental condition.”); see H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (same); S. 
REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (same); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46 
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (anticipating that Congress might call medical witnesses); id. at 
251 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (referring to medical input); 1964 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 6, at 71–73 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (discussing access to medical 
information and personal knowledge of President); id. at 119 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 
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8.  Preferring Procedures 
Those who drafted the Twenty-Fifth Amendment believed that 
procedures for office-holders to use, rather than predetermined solutions, 
could best address the presidential continuity problems the drafters 
confronted.  Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Amendment each provide a 
procedure rather than a self-executing solution.  Section 2, for instance, 
empowered a President to nominate a replacement Vice President who 
would take office upon confirmation by each house of Congress.  Section 3 
provided that a President could voluntarily transfer to the Vice President, 
and then resume, presidential powers and duties by transmitting an 
appropriate letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
President pro tempore of the Senate.  Section 4 created a mechanism 
whereby the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet (or of such other 
body as Congress might designate) could transfer power to the Vice 
President by declaring a President disabled in situations where the President 
did not voluntarily transfer power.  It further provided that the President 
could resume powers unless the Vice President and the aforesaid majority 
challenged that right within four days, in which case the houses of Congress 
would resolve the issue. 
This emphasis on procedures departed from past efforts to address 
problems of presidential continuity.  Although neither the Constitution nor 
statutes had previously done more than mention disability as a possible 
contingency, past responses to presidential vacancy had designated a 
successor, or line of successors, rather than propose a process to fill a 
position.187  To be sure, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment addressed different 
problems—filling a vice presidential (not presidential) vacancy188 and 
handling presidential inability—than had those earlier measures.  Yet the 
procedure-based remedy also responded to a belief in the value of decision 
 
156–57 (statement of Feerick, scholar on presidential succession); 111 CONG. REC. 7938–39 
(1965) (statement of Rep. Durward G. Hall); id. at 7939 (statement of Rep. Poff) (“Surely, 
the decisionmakers, whoever they may be, would not undertake so critical a decision without 
first consulting the experts in the field, namely the gentlemen of the medical profession.”); 
id. (statement of Rep. Clark MacGregor) (expressing an expectation that the Vice President 
and Cabinet would not act “without a consultation with the very finest medical brains which 
were available to them here in the Nation’s Capital”); id. at 7954 (statement of Rep. Gilbert) 
(Section 4 decision would presumably “be made only after adequate consultation with 
medical experts”); id. at 3278 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (discussing possibility of 
psychiatric examination of the President); id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Philip Hart) 
(assuming receipt of medical testimony to resolve a dispute between the President and Vice 
President). 
 187. See also 111 CONG. REC. 7946 (1965) (statement of Rep. Edward Hutchinson) 
(arguing that the Speaker should be automatically elevated to become Vice President).  
Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment authorizes both approaches. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XX, § 3 (“Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a 
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the 
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected . . . .”). 
 188. Cf. 111 CONG. REC. 3279 (1965) (statements of Sen. Bayh and Sen. Ross Bass) 
(explaining omission of the requirement that Congress act “immediately” under Section 2 as 
relating to lesser urgency of filling Vice Presidency than Presidency). 
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making by interested officials able to assess and react to the political 
context when a continuity issue arose.189 
In establishing procedures rather than prescribed outcomes, the 
Amendment reflected an implicit bias in favor of flexible, rather than rigid, 
approaches.  It gave discretion to future decision makers acting within the 
context of an event rather than imposing a solution in advance for all times.  
Rather than identify someone to become Vice President when that position 
fell vacant, it opted for a method of choosing a new Vice President.  Its 
framers rejected electing a second Vice President because that idea would 
interrupt the development of the Vice Presidency into a more robust 
institution and would attract “men of small political stature and 
questionable qualifications.”190  They also resisted suggestions to provide 
bright-line tests for inability,191 defining it only in broad terms.192  Rather 
than dictating certain circumstances when presidential power would be 
transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the Vice President, they 
specified officials to determine when the President was unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of the office.  Rather than resolve a dispute 
automatically in favor of the President or Vice President, they entrusted that 
issue to Congress to decide by a supermajority.  In essence, the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment placed extensive discretion in specified decision makers 
who would be confronted with subsequent vice presidential vacancies or 
presidential inabilities rather than attempting to dictate future results from 
their mid-1960s vantage point. 
9.  A Government of Laws 
The reliance on procedures reflected a faith in the utility of rules to shape 
conduct.  The framers of the Amendment attributed the failure of past 
government decision makers to act during prior presidential inability crises 
to the lack of clear guidelines.193  They believed that rules could provide 
clarity and accordingly channel official conduct.  Sections 2, 3, and 4 
furnished a road map through certain succession crises.  Moreover, the 
framers thought prior Vice Presidents had not acted during past presidential 
inabilities for fear that under the Tyler Precedent, recognizing and acting 
 
 189. Id. at 3256 (statements of Sens. Ervin and Bayh) (arguing that Section 2 procedure is 
more likely to produce a qualified President than designating a particular officer); see id. at 
7949 (statement of Rep. Cohelan) (decisions “must be based on the facts of the time”); id. at 
7952 (statement of Rep. Seymour Halpern) (“We should leave room for human judgment.”). 
 190. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 191. 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (arguing against defining 
disability to avoid “rigidity” and unworkability); see id. at 15,381 (statement of Sen. Bayh) 
(arguing that decision makers at the time would need to judge the severity of disability and 
national problems). 
 192. Id. at 3282 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (defining “inability” and “unable” as the 
President being “unable either to make or communicate his decisions as to his own 
competency to execute the powers and duties of his office”); see id. at 15,381 (statements of 
Sens. Robert F. Kennedy and Bayh) (“It involves physical or mental inability to make or 
communicate his decision regarding his capacity and physical or mental inability to exercise 
the powers and duties of his office.”); see also id. at 15,380–81, 3282–84. 
 193. See Feerick, supra note 122, at 490–91. 
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upon a President’s disability would permanently transfer the office.194  The 
framers thought clarifying those ambiguities would eliminate the 
disincentives to declaring a President disabled.  They thought involving the 
Cabinet would provide the Vice President with political cover.195  They 
thought the norms that these new constitutional duties suggested would 
encourage effective response. 
10.  A Government of People Within Those Laws 
This emphasis on procedures assumed that officials charged with 
responsibility would respond appropriately when contingencies arose.196  
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought the risk of future bad 
conduct was less severe than the hazard of trying to prescribe specific 
outcomes for times and circumstances they could not foresee.  They had 
more confidence in the decisions of future generations acting in context 
than in those they could impose in advance. 
The framers of the Amendment assumed that public officials would act 
with a proper sense of “‘constitutional morality,’”197 that they would not 
allow personal ambition or partisanship to interfere with their obligation to 
act in accordance with the constitutional values implicit in the Amendment.  
Absent this “sense of ‘constitutional morality’”198 no procedure could work.  
Regarding vice presidential vacancy, Bayh thought one needed to assume 
future Congresses would be composed of “reasonable” people who would 
give “reasonable consideration” to a presidential nominee.199  Senator Sam 
Ervin put it more strongly:  “God help this Nation if we ever get a House of 
Representatives, or a Senate, which will wait for a President to die so 
someone whom they love more than their country will succeed to the 
Presidency.”200  The committee reports of the proposed Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment articulated this faith regarding inability determination: 
Without such a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute 
guarantee against usurpation.  No mechanical or procedural solution will 
provide a complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which 
most of the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of 
constitutional propriety exists.  It seems necessary that an attitude be 
 
 194. See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 162–63 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 195. Id. at 162 (statement of Professor Ruth C. Silva) (predicting that clarifying the status 
and tenure of the President would resolve eighty to ninety percent of the problem). 
 196. See 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that the 
“perfection” of the Amendment “is based upon the ability of the men living at the time when 
the measure must be used to cope successfully with the problems and contingencies with 
which they are confronted”). 
 197. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-
1382, at 11 (1964). 
 198. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11. 
 199. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 50 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 200. 111 CONG. REC. 3281 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin.). 
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adopted that presumes we shall always be dealing with ‘reasonable men’ 
at the highest governmental level.201 
These conclusions did not reflect simply an optimistic assessment of 
human nature.  They also rested on a belief that certain institutional 
constraints would promote good behavior.  Legal scholar Paul A. Freund 
suggested that conferring “a solemn constitutional responsibility” on the 
Vice President and Cabinet regarding presidential inability would “impel” 
them to act objectively.202  Brownell assumed that crisis would prompt 
good behavior from decision makers and, if it did not, public opinion 
would.203  Rep. Richard Poff staked his faith that 
the American form of government with its system of checks and balances 
is so structured, that the freedom of the American press is so secure, and 
that the conscience of the American electorate is so sensitive and its 
power so effective that rogues in public office are foredoomed to 
exposure and swift retribution.204 
To be sure, Poff said, “[W]e want a government of laws and not of men, but 
somewhere in the process of administration of the laws, we must commit 
our fate to the basic honesty of the administrators.  Somewhere, sometime, 
somehow, we must trust somebody.”205  Bayh thought “a strong voicing of 
public opinion” and a tradition of deference to the President in high 
executive appointments would discourage misbehavior.206 
This faith in public officials also influenced the discussion of whether 
some time limit should restrict the period during which Congress could 
deliberate on a disability dispute.  Bayh reported a Senate consensus against 
such a limit since “the obedience to and implementation of any law depends 
 
 201. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-
1382, at 11 (1964).  Brownell was essentially the source of this idea and language; it came 
almost verbatim from his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments in 1964. See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 136; see also 1965 House 
Hearings, supra note 5, at 242 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell); 111 CONG. REC. 
7942 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (“If one assumes that the Vice President and most of 
the members of the President’s Cabinet are charlatans, revolutionaries and traitors, we are 
foolish to attempt any solution.”); see id. at 15,591–92 (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (arguing 
that disability decision makers would act in a forthright manner); 110 CONG. REC. 22,995 
(1964) (statement of Sen. Bible). 
 202. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 131 (statement of Professor Freund). 
 203. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241, 243 (statement of former Att’y Gen. 
Brownell); see also 111 CONG. REC. 3275 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“I have more 
faith in the Congress acting in an emergency in the white heat of publicity, with the 
American people looking on.  The last thing Congress would dare to do would be to become 
involved in a purely political move.”); id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (predicting 
Congressmen would “exercise intelligence and patriotism in a time of national crisis”); id. at 
3280 (statement of Sen. Saltonstall) (arguing that “commonsense” of future Congressmen 
would prevent them from filibustering a disability dispute); 110 CONG. REC. 23,001 (1964) 
(statement of Sen. James Pearson) (“[R]eason in a time of crisis will prevail.”). 
 204. 111 CONG. REC. 7942 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff). 
 205. Id.; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 42 (statement of Professor 
James C. Kirby, Jr.) (arguing that the partisan rejection of nominees would arouse public 
outrage). 
 206. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 48 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also id. at 
65 (referring to “glare of publicity and public opinion”). 
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ultimately upon the good will of the vast majority of our governmental 
leaders at all levels.”207  “Somewhere along the line, in our form of 
government, trust must be placed in men to obey and implement the letter 
and spirit of the law.”208 
11.  Conclusion 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflected the foregoing constitutional 
ideals and principles regarding presidential continuity.  In some cases, these 
ideals simply reinforce well-established structural principles like separation 
of powers, accountable decision making, and democratic process.  In other 
instances, the ideals may not have been entrenched in the Constitution or 
only dimly suggested.  The importance of party continuity in succession 
provides a prime example of the Amendment giving constitutional 
dimension to an idea that previously lacked such stature.  As will be 
suggested in Part IV below, many of these ideals can usefully inform 
discussions of successors after the Vice President. 
B.  Legislative Principles 
In addition to the constitutional values it represents, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment offers a useful case study in successful reform regarding 
presidential continuity.  Its ratification represented an enormous legislative 
accomplishment. 
Consider the particulars.  Congress proposed, and the states ultimately 
ratified, a constitutional amendment that addressed the major gaps 
regarding presidential continuity.  If, as David Mayhew has argued, most 
congressmen are motivated largely by a desire to win re-election,209 the 
general topic of presidential continuity would not normally engage their 
attention since the topic offers few obvious electoral benefits.  Moreover, 
the topics, vice presidential vacancy and presidential inability, posed 
institutional disincentives.  The Amendment required Congress to approve 
arrangements that ceded prominence and initiative to the executive, 
reserving for Congress only a reactive and reduced role.  Whereas in two of 
the three succession laws Congress had preferred legislative to executive 
figures,210 the Twenty-Fifth Amendment asked Congress to reduce greatly 
the stature of its leaders in the line of succession. 
Two decisions the Amendment’s framers made further complicated their 
task.  First, they elected to pursue a constitutional amendment, which 
required supermajorities in each house and from the states,211 rather than a 
statutory solution.  In part, they reasoned that doubts regarding 
 
 207. Id. at 42. 
 208. Id. 
 209. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:  THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13–17 (1974). 
 210. See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text. 
 211. See U.S. CONST. art. V (generally requiring that constitutional amendments be 
proposed by two-thirds votes of the House of Representatives and Senate and ratified by 
three-fourths of the states). 
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congressional power to address presidential continuity should be resolved in 
favor of a constitutional amendment.212  Although some believed that 
Congress could address by statute vice presidential vacancy, presidential 
inability,213 or both,214 countervailing views existed.  These were 
particularly strong regarding filling a vice presidential vacancy since the 
Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution prescribed a different procedure for 
choosing the Vice President through the Electoral College or, if need be, the 
contingent election in the Senate.  There also were serious doubts as to 
whether Congress could by statute provide a means to address presidential 
inability.215  The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment concluded that 
divided opinion counseled in favor of the more onerous course of amending 
the Constitution.  They reasoned that a statute “would be open to criticism 
and challenge at a time when absolute legitimacy was needed” and 
concluded that “[w]e must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of 
our Nation’s executive branch.”216 
Having determined to pursue the onerous challenge of amending the 
Constitution, the architects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also decided to 
offer a proposal laden with procedures rather than one which would simply 
empower Congress to legislate later.  There were strategic reasons to follow 
the path chosen.  In part, Bayh and others thought state legislatures might 
be more reluctant to accept an empowering amendment that would 
 
 212. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 8–9 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 8–9 (1965); S. REP. NO. 
88-1382, at 7–8 (1964). 
 213. 111 CONG. REC. 3253–54, 3257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender); see id. at. 
7944 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener); id. at 7945–46 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).  
 214. Id. at 15,585 (statement of Sen. McCarthy).  
 215. The most common constitutional problem stemmed from the language in Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution empowering Congress to decide legislatively what 
officer would act as President following the death, resignation, removal or failure to qualify 
of both the President and Vice President.  Some argued that the explicit grant of power to 
Congress in the event of a double vacancy implicitly denied Congress power to legislate 
regarding a single vacancy.  (In answer to this expressio unius argument, it might be 
suggested that the express power regarding double vacancy may have simply been intended 
as a constitutional reminder to future Congresses of this potential gap needing further 
action.)  In addition, if one thought, as some did, that the Vice President implicitly had 
power to decide whether a presidential inability existed, and if that power was rooted in the 
Constitution, creating an alternative procedure in which others (e.g., the Cabinet) would 
share that power would require a constitutional amendment.  Finally, if one believed that 
repeated practice had given the Tyler Precedent constitutional dimension so that the Vice 
President became President following a presidential death and that the text of the 
Constitution mandated the same result following presidential removal, resignation, or 
inability, an amendment was required to allow a Vice President to act as President 
temporarily when presidential inability occurred. 
 216. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 11, 12; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 11, 12; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, 
at 9, 10; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Bayh) 
(arguing for need to eliminate constitutional doubt); id. at 128–29 (statement of Professor 
Freund) (arguing for constitutional amendment); id. at 135 (statement of Herbert Brownell, 
former Att’y Gen. of the United States) (arguing that constitutional amendment was 
necessary); 111 CONG. REC. 7940 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7942 (statement of 
Rep. McCulloch); id. at 7947 (statement of Rep. Robert McClory); id. at 3254 (statement of 
Sen. Bayh) (“Should we not reconcile such doubt once and for all by inserting in the 
Constitution an amendment which would provide for these contingencies?”); 110 CONG. 
REC. 22,993 (1964) (statement of Sen. Fong). 
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essentially give Congress a blank check to legislate in the future.217  The 
course also guarded against the possibility, perhaps likelihood, that 
Congress would never act to address the specific problems under an 
empowering amendment.218  Finally, some thought a constitutional 
amendment would afford more protection to the President.219  Yet the 
procedurally laden approach meant that Congress had to reach agreement 
on specific matters rather than defer the difficult work. 
Although circumstances contributed to the success of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, that accomplishment also resulted from decisions regarding its 
content and the strategic and skillful manner in which it was shepherded 
through the legislative process.  Although some of those decisions may 
have been context dependent, others may suggest approaches that would be 
useful in fashioning future reforms regarding presidential continuity. 
1.  Seize the Moment 
A confluence of events made the mid-1960s a propitious time to address 
long-standing problems relating to presidential continuity.  The Eisenhower 
disabilities, the Kennedy assassination, the nuclear age, and the rise of the 
Vice Presidency were among the factors that made the times ripe for 
reform.  “Let us stop playing Presidential inability roulette,”220 implored 
Representative Celler in his opening remarks during the House’s 1965 
debate; these factors helped that sentiment resonate. 
Although contemporary events, especially the Kennedy assassination,221 
made presidential continuity a salient issue in the mid-1960s, the 
heightened interest in the topic did not guarantee a favorable outcome.  
Earlier periods had presented crises that had not produced constructive 
change.222  And the events of 9/11 raised the specter of a much more 
serious continuity crisis without corresponding legislative response.  On 
that day, one plane hit the Pentagon and another was headed for either the 
White House or Capitol Building.223  It was not difficult to imagine events 
 
 217. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 132–33 (statement of Professor Freund). 
 218. BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 
35 (1968); see e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4 (amendment empowering Congress to 
provide for death of presidential or vice presidential candidate in contingent election before 
House or Senate, which has yet to prompt congressional action). 
 219. 111 CONG. REC. 7940 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); see BAYH, supra note 218, at 
29–30, 34 (presenting criticisms of empowering amendment based on usurpation of 
presidential position). 
 220. 111 CONG. REC. 7936 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler); see id. at 7938 (urging 
action “lest a catastrophe find us unprepared once again”). 
 221. See Arthur Krock, In the Nation:  Presidential Disability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1965, 
at E11 (attributing final impetus to action to Kennedy assassination). 
 222. For instance, the Lincoln assassination included efforts to eliminate other leading 
figures.  The Garfield assassination left the President incapacitated for eighty days and the 
Wilson strokes did the same for a lengthy period.  Franklin Roosevelt’s death in 1945 
occurred on the eve of the nuclear age, and it took nearly a decade after Eisenhower’s last 
disability to accomplish change. 
 223. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 45 (2004) (stating that United 93 may have attacked the White House or Capitol 
Building had passengers not intervened). 
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that would have compromised America’s arrangements for assuring 
presidential continuity.  Clearly, the executive branch got the message.  
Vice President Cheney retreated to “undisclosed locations” as a means to 
insure continuity of government.224  Yet no legislative change occurred to 
address gaps in governmental continuity, which in some respects were more 
serious than those addressed in the mid-1960s.225 
Significant reform occurred in the mid-1960s, unlike these other 
occasions, in part because the principal advocates of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment recognized the opportunity history had provided and crafted an 
effective strategy to capitalize on it.  They understood that President 
Kennedy’s assassination presented a relatively narrow window in which to 
accomplish reform.226  The impetus to act would dissipate as memory faded 
and attention became diverted.227  They exploited the situation to convert 
opportunity into constructive action. 
2.  Sticking with the Conventional 
Although the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment embraced the 
more arduous constitutional approach instead of a statutory remedy, in other 
respects they opted for conventional, rather than novel, solutions.  The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment boldly tackled problems which prior generations 
had ignored, yet its success owed to the fact that it borrowed heavily from 
existing institutions and practices rather than pushing new or exotic 
approaches.  To a great extent, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment simply 
codified common law developments in governmental operation that practice 
had made familiar.  Its genius lay in part in its willingness to offer 
conventional, not threatening, solutions to vexing problems. 
 
 224. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 84; see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S., supra note 223, at 39–40. 
 225. The greatest problems relate to Congress, not the Presidency.  An attack that killed 
or disabled a large portion of the House of Representatives could prevent government from 
operating as the Constitution prescribes.  Although most states allow the governor to fill a 
Senate vacancy pending a special election, see U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, the Constitution 
does not allow for such appointments to the House of Representatives pending a special 
election. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any 
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”); 
cf. id. amend. XVII (“When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the 
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such 
vacancies:  Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature 
may direct.”).  For a comprehensive discussion, see CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra 
note 7; Howard M. Wasserman, Continuity of Congress:  A Play in Three Stages, 53 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 949 (2004).  
 226. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that 
continuity issues “have a ringing urgency today with the tragedy of our martyred President 
so fresh in our memory”); id. at 150 (statement of Feerick, scholar on presidential 
succession) (“On November 21, 1963, this problem was all but forgotten by the Congress 
and the public.  On November 22 it almost caused a national crisis.”). 
 227. Feerick, supra note 122, at 498; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1 
(statement of Rep. Celler) (“The recent tragic death of President Kennedy has served to 
arouse public interest in the problem.  We cannot permit this interest to languish into apathy 
again.”). 
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Section 1 simply gave textual sanction to the Tyler Precedent with 
respect to death, resignation, or removal of the President.  In those 
instances, the Vice President would become President (rather than simply 
assuming the powers and duties of the office), a practice that had been 
followed eight times between 1841 and the Kennedy assassination on 
November 22, 1963.228 
Although Section 2 created a novel procedure,229 by design, that 
arrangement mirrored the practice that had developed since 1940 that the 
presidential nominee chose his or her running mate.230  That pattern, and 
the migration of the Vice Presidency to the executive branch,231 lent logic 
to allowing the President to initiate the Section 2 selection.  The 
confirmation by the House and Senate drew upon the use of the Senate to 
advise and consent to presidential nominees,232 the involvement of the 
House and Senate in selecting a President and Vice President under the 
contingency election feature of the Constitution, and the fact that together, 
the House and Senate essentially reflected the size of the Electoral College 
(less the District of Columbia, which had three electoral votes but no voting 
representation in Congress).  Thus, Section 2 tracked the manner in which 
vice presidential candidates were chosen and in which Vice Presidents were 
selected. 
Sections 3 and 4 resembled, to a great extent, prior understandings 
regarding inability determinations.  Attorneys General Brownell, William 
Rogers, and Robert F. Kennedy had all concluded that the President could 
temporarily transfer his power to the Vice President,233 and the agreements 
that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson reached with their 
potential successors had included such provisions.234  Section 3 anchored 
that interpretation and procedure in the constitutional text. 
The Attorneys General had also concluded that the Vice President, as the 
person charged to act in the event of a presidential inability, implicitly had 
power to determine its existence.235  The presidential agreements had 
empowered the Vice President to make that decision after such consultation 
 
 228. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 229. 111 CONG. REC. 7955 (1965) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (calling Section 2 “a very 
marked departure from anything that we have heretofore known”).  
 230. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 90 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (noting 
that presidential nominee chooses running mate); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4 
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting that presidential candidate has “great influence” in choice 
of running mate); id. at 137 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (observing that 
political conventions ask presidential nominee to choose running mate); Feerick, supra note 
122, at 489 (“The presidential candidate now selects his running mate so that such a 
nomination would be consistent with present practice.”). 
 231. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 134, 140–42, 146–50; Goldstein, supra 
note 140, at 525. 
 232. 111 CONG. REC. 3256 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 233. See, e.g., Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69 (1961) (stating opinion of 
Robert F. Kennedy). 
 234. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Presidential Inability, supra note 233, at 88–89. 
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as he deemed appropriate.236  Section 4 began with that premise but added 
checks on vice presidential and presidential behavior.  The inclusion of the 
Cabinet or such other body as Congress might create provided a check on 
the Vice President (although it also provided political cover for him); the 
ability of the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge the President’s 
determination that he was fit to resume was a check on the President.  The 
provisions governing a disability dispute reflected, with some modification, 
a proposal that Attorney General Rogers made for the Eisenhower 
Administration in early 1958 and that the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments endorsed in 1958 and 1959.237  The ABA 
conference in January 1964 also essentially favored the approach that 
became the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.238 
The familiarity of the procedures in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment made 
them more palatable.  Novel though it was, the Amendment essentially gave 
constitutional imprimatur to accepted practice or to familiar proposals from 
credible sponsors.  It simply imported common sense into the Constitution. 
3.  Something Is Better Than Nothing 
The principal advocates of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment made 
substantial progress, not perfection, their goal.  They proceeded on the 
assumption that many possible outcomes would improve the status quo.  
They did not insist on any particular fix, just some solution.  As Senator 
Jacob K. Javits put it, after submitting a different proposal than that which 
was adopted, “[a]ny action in this within the range presented . . . is almost 
better than no action, which is the way the situation stands today.”239  It was 
not important, said private citizen (and future President) Richard M. Nixon, 
that Congress adopt his proposals but that it take some action to address 
inability and succession.240  Senator Robert F. Kennedy had misgivings 
about Section 4’s reliance on the Cabinet but thought the dangers of 
inaction were “greater still.”241 
The architects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not make perfection 
the enemy of the good.  Representative Celler acknowledged that the 
proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment was “by no means . . . a perfect bill.  
 
 236. Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the 
Event of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196 (Mar. 3, 1958); see supra notes 18–19 and 
accompanying text.  
 237. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 240–42. 
 238. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSENSUS ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND SUCCESSION, 
JANUARY 20 AND 21, 1964, reprinted in 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 6–7.  The 
ABA consensus differed from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in two relatively minor 
respects.  It would have provided that in the absence of a Vice President the person next in 
line could act in his stead under the presidential inability procedures and that the Vice 
President would be confirmed by a joint session of Congress. See id. 
 239. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 55 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits). 
 240. Id. at 234, 238, 244, 250 (statement of former Vice President Nixon). 
 241. 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy); see also id. at 
15,382 (describing Amendment better than status quo notwithstanding remaining problems). 
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No bill can be perfect.  Even the sun has its spots.  The world of actuality 
permits us to attain no perfection.”242 
Similarly, they reconciled themselves to the fact that they could not hope 
to address “every conceivable situation.”243  They understood they were 
leaving some problems unsolved.  They were aware of the possibility of a 
double vacancy occurring in various ways244 and of the gaps in the electoral 
system,245 for instance, but thought that trying to solve those more remote 
events would impede achieving agreement on more likely problems.  When 
Poff asked whether “it would complicate matters greatly” if the Amendment 
included a provision empowering the next in line to initiate action declaring 
the President disabled in the absence of a Vice President, Bayh replied that 
since the next in line was the Speaker of the House such a provision would 
open up “the whole can of worms.”246  Brownell conceded that Sections 3 
and 4 did not cover every imaginable contingency but argued that they 
addressed at least ninety percent of the foreseeable problems and on that 
basis deserved adoption before further mishaps occurred.247 
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment focused on the principal 
problems even at the cost of abandoning features to which some were 
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strongly committed, such as restoring a Cabinet line of succession or 
addressing pre-inaugural problems.248  Some contingencies were left 
unaddressed because 
the more complicated you make a constitutional amendment, quite 
frankly, the more contingencies for which you provide, the more difficult 
it is to get it passed. . . . What we tried to do is provide for the most likely 
eventualities and hope we can get it through, feeling we would have most 
of these things covered.249 
4.  Compromise 
Consistent with the realization that the status quo was unacceptable, the 
architects of the Amendment understood progress depended on their 
willingness to compromise.  Feerick sounded this theme when he told the 
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments that “[t]he time has 
come for those who are genuinely interested in the safety of this Nation to 
stop emphasizing those points on which they differ and to start emphasizing 
those points on which they agree.”250  The framers of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment believed that failure to reach consensus had, in the past, 
prevented reform.251  By word and deed, they successfully cultivated a 
spirit of compromise and the Amendment Congress ultimately proposed 
reflected a series of compromises.252  For instance, their formulation for 
filling a vice presidential vacancy fell somewhere on the middle of the 
spectrum of the proposals Congress considered.  It gave the President 
greater control over the selection of a Vice President than did Senator 
Ervin’s proposal that Congress elect a new Vice President,253 or that of 
Senator Frank Church that Congress choose a Vice President from two to 
five candidates that the President nominated,254 but less control than the 
proposal former Vice President Nixon and others offered that would have 
allowed the President to nominate someone for consideration by the 
Electoral College.255  They added language to Section 4 to allow Congress 
to replace the Cabinet with some other body in order to address the 
preference of some, that the entire issue be left to Congress to resolve 
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through legislation.256  That approach tried “to make the best of both 
worlds.”257  The time limits in Section 4—that the Vice President and 
Cabinet had four days to challenge the President’s declaration that he was 
able to discharge the duties of the office, that Congress would assemble 
within forty-eight hours to decide a disability dispute between the President 
and Vice President, and that Congress would decide such a dispute within 
twenty-one days—were all products of compromises, and in some instances 
of multiple compromises, within the House and Senate and between the two 
branches.258 
5.  Dedicated Leadership 
Congress would not have proposed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment but for 
the dedicated leadership of Bayh and others.  For a freshman senator in the 
first third of his term, chairing the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments provided a rare and precious early opportunity to demonstrate 
leadership in the Senate.  Following the death of the prior chair, Senator 
Estes Kefauver, and less than two months before the Kennedy 
assassination, Senator James Eastland, chair of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, acceded to Bayh’s request that he allow him to chair that 
subcommittee rather than closing it as planned.259 
That decision, fortuitous in multiple ways, represented a turning point.  
Passing a constitutional amendment addressing presidential continuity 
became Bayh’s mission.  He offered his proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 
139, on December 12, 1963, less than three weeks after the Kennedy 
assassination, and announced that his subcommittee would conduct 
comprehensive hearings on presidential succession and inability the 
following month.260  He helped formulate and articulate the strategic 
decisions reflected above—choosing the constitutional route, sticking with 
conventional solutions, pushing for some reform, and making compromises 
even when they meant leaving some areas untouched.  But he also focused 
on the problem in a single-minded way, which a more senior senator with 
other responsibilities would not have done.  He skillfully accessed the 
talents and resources of others to lend clout to the effort—enlisting Senator 
Ervin as a principal Senate advocate, using Brownell to obtain help from 
former President Eisenhower and from Representative Celler, the chair of 
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the House Committee on the Judiciary,261 and lobbying friends at the White 
House to obtain a presidential endorsement of his proposal.262 
Bayh was not the only leader in the effort.  Celler had been interested in 
the issue since the mid-1950s263 and had then articulated some of the basic 
principles that later became the basis for the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement 
and part of Sections 1, 3, and 4.264  He was disposed to shepherd House 
Joint Resolution 1 through the House.  Brownell had also played a critical 
role in developing the ideas behind Sections 1, 3, and 4 as Eisenhower’s 
attorney general and resumed his involvement with the issue following the 
Kennedy assassination.265  The ABA convened a conference of twelve 
prominent attorneys to consider the issue two months after Kennedy’s 
assassination; it released its consensus report of guiding principles in 
January 1964.266  Those principles largely tracked Bayh’s proposal, Senate 
Joint Resolution 139, and the eventual Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Senior 
Senate colleagues—Ervin, Everett Dirksen, Roman Hruska, Javits, John 
Stennis, John Sherman Cooper, Mike Mansfield—and some in the House, 
most notably Representative Poff, in addition to Celler, played constructive 
roles at important junctures.  But without Bayh’s commitment to moving 
the measure, it would not have emerged. 
6.  Percolating Ideas 
Contextual factors, particularly the Eisenhower disabilities and Kennedy 
assassination, had drawn attention to problems of presidential continuity.  
Yet scholars and a few public officials played an important role in keeping 
the problem and the search for solutions on the national radar screen.  Celler 
had reached out to many in the academic community in 1955 in a search for 
solutions.267  Brownell and then Rogers offered proposals regarding 
presidential inability in the late 1950s that foreshadowed Sections 1, 3, and 
4.268  These ideas and others were explored in hearings in both houses of 
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Congress during the late 1950s and early 1960s.269  Prior to the Kennedy 
assassination, Feerick, then a young lawyer, published an influential 
scholarly examination of the subject in the Fordham Law Review.270  
Following the assassination, Feerick wrote several other articles, which 
pointed out the importance of the problem and made the case for the 
proposals set forth in Senate Joint Resolution 139 and Senate Joint 
Resolution 1.271  The esteemed constitutional law scholar, Paul A. Freund, 
made important contributions and Bayh drew from the testimony of some 
eminent academics, even those who had misgivings regarding some aspects 
of his proposed solutions, such as presidential scholars Clinton Rossiter and 
Richard Neustadt.272 
The discussion of the issue, among public officials, scholars, lawyers, 
and others over a period of time273 helped create a broad-based 
commitment to the importance of achieving some reform.  Moreover, a 
consensus developed around the merits of Bayh’s proposal, which 
essentially reflected the recommendations of the ABA conference on the 
subject.274  Even those who offered different proposals viewed Bayh’s 
proposal as a reasonable approach and a substantial improvement on the 
status quo.  The endorsement of experts lent credibility to the enterprise. 
7.  Mobilized Support 
The Amendment succeeded in part because of the broad support it 
attracted, at an elite and grass roots level.  Its proponents enlisted the help 
of some who had been intimately involved with problems of presidential 
succession and inability.  Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson both spoke 
publicly in support of the proposed Amendment or its central ideas as did 
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former Vice President Nixon.275  Former Attorney General Brownell was 
an active and effective voice and some of his successors also played helpful 
roles.276  Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach ultimately abandoned his 
earlier support for an amendment empowering Congress to act to endorse 
Senate Joint Resolution 1.277 
Bayh involved the ABA in his push for a constitutional amendment in 
December 1963.  It had previously favored the empowering amendment, 
which Senator Keating championed.278  Beginning in January 1964, the 
ABA held a variety of public and private sessions on the topic and endorsed 
and lobbied in its favor at a national and local level.  A blue ribbon ABA 
group endorsed a consensus approach, which largely coincided with Bayh’s 
proposal in January 1964.279  Bayh spoke to the ABA House of Delegates, 
after which it voted to endorse his plan.280  ABA Presidents Walter Craig 
and Lewis Powell testified in support of Bayh’s proposals and wrote and 
spoke on the topic.  Powell pledged that the ABA would “‘throw our full 
weight’” behind the Bayh-Celler proposal in January 1965,281 and ABA 
staff worked to lobby members of Congress and to develop support around 
the country.  When the Senate and House conferees were unable to reach 
agreement on the last sticking point, ABA President Powell met with Celler 
to urge him to persuade his colleagues to compromise.  The media ran any 
number of stories on the proposed measure and it received widespread 
endorsement.  The ABA also worked to persuade states to ratify the 
proposed amendment.282  From inception to ratification, the ABA played a 
critical role in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.283 
8.  Something for Everyone 
The Amendment’s prospects were enhanced by its inclusive nature.284  
The measure won the support of the executive branch in part because it 
rejected approaches—congressional nomination of a Vice President, 
congressional initiation of inability proceedings—which would have 
intruded on presidential turf.  Sections 3 and 4 paralleled proposals of 
Eisenhower’s Attorneys General and were accepted by the Johnson White 
 
 275. See e.g., Russell Baker, Nixon, in Capitol, Essays 2 Roles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1964, 
at 15; Eisenhower Lists Succession Views, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1964, at 25; Krock, supra 
note 221 (citing importance of Johnson’s support in House of Representatives). 
 276. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 279. 
 277. Bayh Interview, supra note 262, at 3. 
 278. BAYH, supra note 218, at 36, 42–50. 
 279. Id. at 171–73. 
 280. Id. at 62–63. 
 281. Felix Belair, Jr., Capitol Hearings Set on Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1965, at 
15 (quoting Powell). 
 282. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 279. 
 283. See, e.g., BAYH, supra note 218, at 42–43, 45–46, 50, 52, 62–63, 336; Kenworthy, 
supra note 258, at 16 (citing Bayh’s acknowledgement of the ABA’s role); Bayh Interview, 
supra note 262, at 3. 
 284. See, e.g., Fred Graham, What Kind of Amendment on Disability?, N.Y. TIMES, July 
4, 1965, at E4 (crediting Bayh with pasting together provisions “borrowed” from powerful 
sources). 
1010 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
House and Justice Department.  Congress was given roles in Sections 2 and 
4.  Although the framers wanted to elevate vice presidential confirmation 
beyond the normal advice and consent procedure and to mimic in some 
respects the size of the Electoral College, they also recognized that a 
confirmation procedure which included both houses was more likely to win 
bicameral approval than one which, like the normal advice and consent 
procedure, only involved the Senate.285  The provision giving Congress the 
option of replacing the Cabinet with an “other body” made the Amendment 
more palatable to those who thought Congress should have a greater role.286 
9.  Navigating Around Personal Sensitivities 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified in part because the framers 
were able to navigate away from proposals that were seen as disparaging 
powerful figures who were in the line of succession.  In particular, much 
discussion regarding the need to change the system as it existed following 
Kennedy’s assassination focused on the common perception that neither 
McCormack nor Hayden provided an acceptable successor.287  Some of 
McCormack’s allies regarded Section 2 as an affront and the perceived 
insult to McCormack made House action impossible until the election of a 
new Vice President removed that innuendo. 
Bayh took four steps to numb any insult.  First, he dropped from the 
original version of his proposal provisions that would have changed the line 
of succession following the Vice President to run through the Cabinet as a 
matter of constitutional law.288  Second, he consistently emphasized that the 
need for a Vice President was independent of the identity of the Speaker.  
The inherent nature of the Vice President, as the office had developed, 
made it ideally suited to serve as the successor while the possibility that the 
Speaker would belong to the opposite party and his ongoing duties made 
him ill-suited for the role.289  Third, Bayh felt compelled to rebut frequently 
the suggestion that McCormack was not up to acting as President, as in his 
opening statement at the 1964 hearings290 and on other occasions.291  There 
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was no question about McCormack’s “capabilit[ies],” Bayh asserted.292  
The issue went beyond “the age or personality of the Speaker.”293  There 
were problems relating to separation of powers, whether a Speaker would 
resign his or her seat to act as President if the Chief Executive were 
disabled, the possibility of shift in party control of the Presidency, and the 
competing burdens of running the House of Representatives and 
understudying the President.294  Finally, Bayh reconciled himself to the fact 
that the House would not move on an amendment which included a 
provision to fill a vice presidential vacancy until a new Vice President was 
inaugurated following the 1964 presidential election.295 
10.  Building Momentum 
Several events, some serendipitous, some the product of sound strategy, 
helped Bayh develop a consensus to propel his proposal forward.  Bayh’s 
subcommittee reported Senate Joint Resolution 139 unanimously in 1964 
with the understanding that Keating and others could seek to replace it with 
their different proposals on the floor.296  When the Senate Judiciary 
Committee met to consider whether to report Senate Joint Resolution 139 to 
the Senate, some sentiment favored reporting several competing proposals 
out, a course almost followed.  Bayh prevented that result by arguing that 
such a move would prevent any action and by agreeing that others could 
offer their proposals as amendments on the floor.  Since the committee 
members knew Congress would not act until the next session, some saw 
little risk in acceding to Bayh’s request.297 
Bayh had asked majority leader Mike Mansfield to schedule the topic for 
floor debate during the fall of 1964 even though there was no prospect of 
the House acting.298  Since Section 2 pivoted on the Vice Presidency, 
discussion of it provided a vehicle for Democrats to emphasize the 
comparative advantage of the Democratic vice presidential candidate, 
Hubert H. Humphrey, over his Republican rival, Representative William E. 
Miller (who Barry M. Goldwater admitted he had chosen because “he 
drives Johnson nuts”299).  Mansfield ultimately scheduled debate on 
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September 28, 1964, and much of the discussion, by Democrats and 
Republicans alike, addressed the importance of the second office.  The 
Senate passed the proposed amendment by a voice vote with relatively few 
members on the floor.300 
The following day, to Bayh’s chagrin, Senator Stennis objected that the 
Constitution should not be amended by voice vote.301  Accordingly, a roll 
call vote was held at which Bayh’s Senate Joint Resolution 139 passed 
sixty-five to zero.302  Senators knew the House would not act, which 
lessened the significance of their votes; some perhaps did not scrutinize the 
proposal as much as they might have.  Still, the revote put sixty-five 
Senators on record in favor of Bayh’s proposal and thereby strengthened his 
hand in the next Congress.303  The favorable Senate action in 1964 enabled 
the Senate to act on the proposal early during the next Congress before 
other measures crowded its calendar.304 
The election of Johnson as President and particularly, of Humphrey as 
Vice President, removed some of the sensitivity from the issue.  Celler, the 
chair of the House Judiciary Committee, agreed to introduce in the House a 
resolution (House Joint Resolution 1) parallel to that Bayh offered in the 
Senate (Senate Joint Resolution 1).  The White House called for action on 
presidential continuity in Johnson’s State of the Union305 and Johnson 
followed with a message to Congress calling for action on presidential 
inability and vice presidential vacancy and endorsing Bayh’s approach.306  
The ultimate votes were almost anticlimactic.307 
11.  Conclusion 
To be sure the historic context contributed to the ratification of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Yet it is a mistake to attribute the Amendment 
to the temper of those times to the exclusion of all else.  On other occasions, 
continuity crises have not produced action.  Events did not make the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment inevitable.  Rather, the Amendment occurred 
 
 300. BAYH, supra note 218, at 156. 
 301. Id. at 157–58. 
 302. 110 CONG. REC. 23,061 (1964). 
 303. BAYH, supra note 218, at 159.   
 304. Id. at 202. 
 305. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 8 (Jan. 
4, 1965) (“I will propose laws to insure the necessary continuity of leadership should the 
President become disabled or die.”).  Johnson’s formulation led some to believe he did not 
support the Bayh-Celler plan but would offer a different proposal.  Johnson rebutted that 
misconception twenty-four days later. See infra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 306. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 100, 102 (Jan. 28, 1965). 
 307. Senate Joint Resolution 1 passed 72–0 in the Senate on February 19, 1965. 111 
CONG. REC. 3286 (1965).  In amended form, it passed 368–29 in the House on April 13, 
1965. Id. at 7968–69.  After conference, during which contention centered around the 
timetable for congressional action under Section 4, the House approved the proposed 
amendment by voice vote. Id. at 15,216.  The Senate did so in a 68–5 vote on July 6, 1965. 
Id. at 15,596. 
2010] LESSONS IN ENSURING PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY 1013 
because of the manner in which Bayh and others responded to the 
circumstances they encountered. 
Some of the decisions they made may have little bearing on the issues 
that remain today.  Others, however, may provide guidance for those 
interested in bringing further reform. 
III.  THE MODERN CONTEXT 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment represented a major advance in ensuring 
presidential continuity.  Its framers made a necessary strategic choice to 
focus their efforts on remedying the principal problems rather than to 
pursue a quixotic quest for a comprehensive fix.  Accordingly, proposals to 
address disability determinations absent a Vice President, the line of 
succession after the Vice President, and pre-inauguration problems were 
deferred. 
Forty-five years after Congress acted on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
those gaps remain.  They do so, however, in a different context than that in 
which the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment acted.  Two 
developments since 1967 make the system of ensuring presidential 
continuity stronger than it was the day the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was 
ratified.  Three other developments add urgency to moving toward further 
reform. 
This part briefly discusses the way in which the enhanced role of the 
Vice Presidency and precedents under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
contribute to presidential continuity.  It then identifies several developments 
since the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that suggest that 
continuity issues merit further attention and action. 
A.  Exceeding Expectations:  The Vice Presidency Transformed 
The recent transformation of the Vice Presidency has enhanced the 
ability of the system to respond to presidential continuity problems.  The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflected a new and optimistic vision of the Vice 
Presidency.308  The development of the office has, however, as Yogi Berra 
remarked in an entirely different context,309 more than exceeded those 
expectations.  That vision had not become reality when the Amendment 
was proposed or ratified,310 and the following decade made clear remaining 
limitations of the office.  Johnson mistreated Humphrey, his able Vice 
President,311 and Richard Nixon abused Spiro T. Agnew, his not 
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particularly able and corrupt Vice President.312  Gerald Ford liked, but 
dumped, Nelson Rockefeller from his 1976 ticket; before Ford’s term 
ended, some respected scholars of American government were calling for 
dumping the office.313 
The Vice Presidency of Walter F. Mondale constituted the “big bang” 
which brought the Vice Presidency into line with the vision implicit in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.314  Mondale became Jimmy Carter’s senior 
adviser and troubleshooter and gained a range of resources that his 
successors have retained.  Every Vice President, beginning with Mondale, 
has had one of the principal offices in the West Wing near the Oval Office; 
has had daily access to the President; has been included on the White House 
distribution list; and has participated, either personally or through staff, on 
all significant policy making councils.  Vice Presidents and their staffs now 
are integral parts of White House decision making.  In addition, Vice 
Presidents perform significant troubleshooting.  The level of vice 
presidential influence varies depending on the mix of a number of factors, 
yet vice presidential significance is now inevitable.315 
In addition, the quality of Vice Presidents has increased.  Virtually all of 
those who have served as Vice President since Mondale have been among 
the ablest public figures of their times,316 and institutional changes provide 
candidates incentive to choose well.  Most questionable choices are made 
by those far behind in the polls whose options are limited or who need to 
take some dramatic step to shake up the race. 
The transformation of the office has important implications for ensuring 
presidential continuity.  The enhanced role of the Vice President better 
prepares that officer to succeed in the event of presidential vacancy by 
keeping him engaged in decision making.  The status of the Vice President 
as an integral part of the President’s team, not an outsider, makes it more 
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likely that Presidents or their associates will use the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to transfer power from an incapacitated President when 
appropriate.  Accordingly, there is reason to believe succession under 
Section 1 will achieve the Amendment’s continuity goals and that Sections 
3 and 4 will be implemented more often and more effectively than might 
have been the case when the Amendment was proposed or ratified.317 
B.  Twenty-Fifth Amendment Precedents 
The implementations of the various provisions of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment since 1967 have established some helpful precedents.  I will 
not repeat the earlier discussion other than to underscore several significant 
features.  First, the confirmations of Ford and Rockefeller provided a set of 
precedents involving presidential decision making and congressional 
conduct.318  In each case, a Congress in which Democratic majorities 
controlled both houses overwhelmingly confirmed a Republican nominee.  
They helped establish an expectation that a President is entitled to 
confirmation of a presidential Vice President and that Congress is 
responsible to make a thorough investigation under the circumstances and 
to act in a manner generally free of partisanship.  Second, Presidents have 
established the pattern of transferring power when they undergo anesthesia 
and have developed other protocols for handling unexpected inabilities.319 
C.  Wake Up Calls 
These positive changes do not, however, justify complacency or the 
relative inaction in this area since 1967.  Three quite different developments 
suggest further action is needed. 
First, although circumstances have never required anyone other than a 
Vice President to discharge presidential powers following a presidential 
vacancy, conditions post 9/11 increase the possibility of a continuity crisis 
involving multiple vacancies.  America narrowly avoided a double vacancy 
even before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  The specter of such an event 
increases in an age of terrorism in which extraordinary weapons are 
becoming more readily accessible to non-state actors whose ultimate 
professed ambition is to injure seriously the United States.  Government 
buildings were among the actual and intended targets on 9/11.  Vice 
President Cheney’s subsequent practice of working from undisclosed 
locations reflected the perceived need to disperse the nation’s top two 
officers to upset any plans to create a continuity crisis.  The possibility of an 
attack that would kill or disable multiple leaders cannot be dismissed. 
Second, since 1967, presidential health has attracted increased attention.  
Scholars have produced studies that provide a greater awareness of the 
variety and complexity of situations that might occasion presidential 
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inability and the difficulty of addressing it in certain situations.320  We now 
know that Franklin Pierce and Calvin Coolidge were depressed for much of 
their time in office following the death of their sons and that, in Coolidge’s 
case, the trauma transformed his performance,321 that Franklin Roosevelt’s 
health was failing before he ran for a fourth term,322 and that John F. 
Kennedy’s medical problems were more severe and his drug abuse more 
reckless than anyone could have imagined in 1967.323  Some close aides of 
Lyndon B. Johnson questioned his sanity,324 and Richard M. Nixon’s 
mental state in the last weeks of his Presidency was sufficiently precarious 
to cause some close associates to take extraordinary precautions.325  
Research on presidential health has disclosed that various Presidents 
suffered from serious ailments, which, to varying degrees, compromised 
their ability to serve. 
Similarly, events have reminded us of the mortality of existing Presidents 
and Vice Presidents.  Ford was the target of two assassination attempts, 
Reagan was shot, and other efforts to kill various Presidents have been 
foiled.  Reagan was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease some years after 
leaving office.  Some suspected, both while he was in office and thereafter, 
that he was impaired to an extent, which questioned his ability to serve.326  
George H.W. Bush had one heart-related episode as President; Cheney had 
several as Vice President. 
Finally, the 2000 presidential election provided a contemporary version 
of a failure of the presidential electoral system to produce a clear winner.  It 
raised the specter that vote counting issues could impede the ability of the 
presidential electoral system to produce a victor, educated many to the fact 
that counting ballots may sometimes become a subjective exercise, and 
introduced the possibility that presidential elections could become the 
subject of litigation so that judicial decisions as well as electoral counts 
could shape the outcome.  Moreover, the absence of reform following the 
Bush election rebutted the common expectation that election of a President 
without an electoral vote majority would sound the death knell of the 
Electoral College.  In fact, the Bush election, based on a disputed electoral 
vote majority despite receiving more than 500,000 fewer popular votes than 
Vice President Al Gore,327 made reform, which would have been difficult 
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in any event, impossible since it committed the Republican party to 
preserving the institution so as not to impeach Bush’s entitlement to the 
Presidency. 
One would have hoped that the confluence of these events would have 
produced appropriate reform.  It has not.  Some private groups have studied 
these problems,328 and the Continuity of Government Commission has 
engaged in a comprehensive review.329  No legislative progress has 
resulted. 
IV.  AFTER THE VICE PRESIDENT 
A.  Introduction:  Succession After the Vice President 
The Vice Presidency does not provide protection against all presidential 
continuity contingencies.  Some line of succession after the Vice President 
must exist to address a double vacancy which occurs, whether before or 
after the inauguration.  It must address a variety of contingencies—death, 
resignation, removal, inability, and failure to qualify—which could produce 
that double vacancy.  This list understates the complexity of the challenge 
since some labels (e.g., inability, failure to qualify) summarize multiple 
precipitating causes.  Moreover, vacancies may present different 
considerations depending on whether they create the need for a successor 
on a permanent or temporary basis.  Finally, there are no formal procedures 
for declaring a President disabled absent a functioning Vice President. 
A series of gaps mar the system for assuring presidential continuity after 
the Vice Presidency.  Four general points are worth considering at the 
outset.  First, although these gaps involve contingencies that are seemingly 
remote, they cannot be dismissed, especially in an age of terrorism and 
proliferating nuclear weapons.  In some cases, they would prove very 
difficult to resolve if they did occur.  This could prove especially true 
regarding the line of succession after the Vice President in a situation where 
the electoral system fails to produce a President.330 
Second, these problems are, to a great extent, interrelated.  For instance, 
the identity of the person(s) next in line behind the Vice President will 
affect the handling of presidential inability absent a functioning Vice 
President. Although pre-inaugural and post-inaugural contingencies 
implicate different constitutional provisions, a consideration of who should 
follow the Vice President must address both time periods. 
Third, solving some of these problems may be complicated if, as seems 
likely, Congress resists changing two overarching features of the existing 
landscape.  In particular, Congress is likely to be disposed to perpetuate the 
current method, which places legislative leaders atop the line of succession.  
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Moreover, the existence of the Electoral College system has residual 
support even though it complicates some pre-inaugural contingencies. 
Finally, to the extent Congress has acted in this area, its approach has 
suffered badly from its tendency to adopt formulaic, one size fits all 
remedies rather than tailoring solutions to the problems presented.  In short, 
the Presidential Succession Law of 1947, which in some sense addresses 
these gaps, tries to solve several different problems with responses not well 
tailored to many, perhaps most, of the situations that might arise. 
Although Section 2 substantially reduced the significance of the line of 
succession after the Vice President by dramatically decreasing the 
likelihood that such a person would ever be first in line,331 it did not 
eliminate the problem.  Succession after the Vice President presents two 
central dilemmas.  The conventional problem is simply that a presidential 
vacancy or disability could still occur when the Vice Presidency is 
unoccupied (prior to nomination or confirmation of a new Vice President 
under Section 2) or the President and Vice President could die or be 
disabled, or the offices could otherwise fall vacant, simultaneously.  Who 
should be number three, after the President and Vice President?  Who 
should be two heartbeats away from the Presidency? 
The second problem involves the possibility of a catastrophe, most likely 
from a nuclear or terrorist attack that eliminates or disables many in the line 
of presidential succession.  The question it raises is not who should be third 
(or fourth) in line, but how should the line be drawn at its more remote 
links, what direction should it take, and what points should it connect?  
Whereas the conventional problem raises the question of who should 
immediately follow the Vice President, the mass catastrophe problem faces 
the quite different challenge of constructing a line likely to leave someone 
left who is equipped to act as President if a common disaster eliminates the 
heartbeats of a number of presidential successors. 
Pursuant to the power conferred in the original Presidential Successors 
Clause,332 Congress has passed legislation which has alternated between 
three approaches—a legislative approach in 1792, a Cabinet line in 1886, 
and a combined legislative-Cabinet line of succession after the Vice 
President in 1947.333  Although the Constitution empowers Congress to 
designate what “Officer” shall act as President following a double vacancy, 
Congress has always created a line after the Vice President with anywhere 
from two to seventeen persons in it.  Notwithstanding the text’s use of the 
singular, no one seems inclined to apply the clause literally in this regard 
and longstanding practice coupled with pragmatic considerations would 
seem to make a long line firmly entrenched.  The current line begins with 
the Speaker of the House and then the President pro tempore of the Senate, 
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followed by the Cabinet with the departments listed according to when 
created.334  The 1947 law provides that a person must resign his or her 
position to act as President335 and that the Speaker or President pro tempore 
can “bump” or supplant a Cabinet officer who is acting as President.336 
The last two laws, in 1886 and 1947, attempted to address both the 
conventional and the mass catastrophe problems.  They identified an 
immediate successor, the Secretary of State and Speaker of the House, 
respectively, and created lines consisting of seven and initially eleven after 
the Vice President.337  Although both the two heartbeats away and mass 
catastrophe problems involve the question of how to provide a legitimate 
and able presidential successor, they basically raise analytically distinct 
issues that merit separate treatment. 
B.  Who Should Be Two (or Three) Heartbeats Away?  Some Constitutional 
Considerations 
The current line places the Speaker of the House and President pro 
tempore of the Senate two and three heartbeats away.  Congress adopted 
this line in response to Truman’s June 1945 proposal predicated on his 
belief that it was inappropriate for him, as President, to appoint his 
successor.338  Sam Rayburn, himself a vice presidential contender in 1944, 
was Speaker of the House, and the Speaker had come from the President’s 
party for forty-three of the last fifty years.  Truman pointed out that the 
House was “[u]sually . . . in agreement politically with the Chief 
Executive.”339  By the time Congress acted, however, the Republicans had 
won control of the House and Senate in the 1946 elections.340 
Of course, anyone assessing or recommending congressional action must 
first be satisfied that the Constitution gives Congress power to adopt the 
measure under consideration.  Although no serious argument has been 
advanced against the constitutionality of Cabinet succession, a number of 
able scholars have challenged the constitutionality of legislative 
succession,341 and their position probably represents the academic 
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consensus today.  During the last sixty-five years, much of the discussion 
regarding the merits of legislative versus Cabinet succession has turned on 
constitutional analysis that has been informed largely by interpretivist 
arguments based primarily on the constitutional text and the intent of the 
framers of the original Constitution. 
If legislative succession is generally unconstitutional, the menu of 
options narrows, and the discussion shortens considerably.  In my view, 
however, the case against legislative succession based on these sort of 
interpretivist arguments is not convincing, nor are the more persuasive 
arguments against legislative succession based on the structure of the 
original Constitution decisive. 
Article II empowers Congress, in the absence of a functioning President 
or Vice President, to designate an “Officer” to act as President.342  The 
word “Officer,” some argue, is intended to be synonymous with “Officer of 
the United States.”343  An earlier draft at the Constitutional Convention had 
used the longer formulation but a Committee of Style, which had 
jurisdiction over form but not substance, shortened it to the one word that 
appears in the Constitution.344  The term “Officer of the United States” and 
similar phrases used elsewhere in the Constitution345 exclude legislative 
leaders, who are not commissioned, cannot be impeached, and may serve in 
Congress notwithstanding the Incompatibility Clause.346 
Further evidence suggests that the drafters of the Constitution intended 
“Officer” to be a shorthand for “Officer of the United States.”  James 
Madison, the father of the Constitution, argued in 1792 that Congress could 
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not place a legislative leader in the line of succession for this reason,347 and 
most of the very few members of the Second Congress who had been 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention seemed to share that view.348 
But the arguments based on text and intent of the framers are not 
unequivocal.  There is no evidence that the drafters’ apparent intent was 
known to the ratifiers or to the population at large.  The drafters may have 
equated “Officer” with “Officer of the United States” but the text as ratified 
empowered Congress to name an “Officer,” not an “Officer of the United 
States.”  Ratifiers may have interpreted the distinction as significant, 
particularly since the Speaker and arguably the President pro tempore were 
referred to elsewhere in the Constitution349 as “Officers.”350  Moreover, just 
three years after the Constitution went into effect, the Second Congress 
adopted the initial succession law that placed the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and Speaker of the House in the line of succession, two and three 
heartbeats away.  Its members presumably had some understanding of how 
the term was used.  Alexander Hamilton, himself a significant Framer, 
favored that law and George Washington, President of the Constitutional 
Convention, signed it as President of the United States.351  Of course, 
Hamilton’s antipathy to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson may have 
dictated his interpretation,352 but Madison’s friendship and political 
association with Jefferson may have influenced his own view.353  
Washington might have been expected to veto a law that unconstitutionally 
infringed on the executive branch; he did not, and his motives were, at least 
according to national myth, pure. 
The textual and originalist arguments strike me as inconclusive, 
particularly when one considers that they did not persuade a contemporary 
Congress and President (and not just any President, George Washington).  
Marbury v. Madison354 reminds us, of course, that even an early Congress 
could be deemed to have acted unconstitutionally.355  Yet we should be 
more willing to accept Chief Justice Marshall’s view that his coevals 
misunderstood what the Constitution meant than we should be to credit 
similar judgments by our contemporaries regarding the original Framers’ 
intent. 
Especially since text and originalist arguments do not settle the matter, as 
they generally do not, it is appropriate to consider other types of 
constitutional reasoning to construe a Constitution intended “to endure for 
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ages.”356  Longstanding practice regarding institutional arrangements helps 
shape constitutional meaning357 and legislative succession commands 
substantial support from that interpretive mode.  After all, for 157 years of 
American history since 1792, the line of succession as established by 
Congress has placed legislative leaders behind the Vice President.  Cabinet 
succession was in place for only sixty-one years, from 1886 to 1947, and 
was imposed in 1886 to avoid a situation in which no legislative leaders 
existed.358 
The most powerful constitutional arguments against legislative 
succession come from the structure of the Constitution.359  Legislative 
succession allows Congress an unlimited right to choose a President.  That 
resembles parliamentary government, which our Constitution emphatically 
rejected.  The creation of the Electoral College to choose the President 
reflected a commitment that Congress should not choose the Chief 
Executive and that, unless impeached and convicted, he or she should enjoy 
a tenure of office independent of its control.  That was one aspect of the 
separation of powers.  The Incompatibility Clause reflected another in its 
prohibition against legislators holding office.360  If legislative leaders retain 
their seats and offices in Congress while acting as President, they violate at 
least the spirit of the Incompatibility Clause.  Moreover, they would be 
subject to removal, and accordingly control, by their constituents and the 
house in which they serve.  That would create a strange situation in which 
an acting President was politically accountable not to the nation but to a 
geographic subunit, and to one house of Congress.  If they resign those 
positions, they may not be “officers” as envisioned by the Constitution.  
Finally, legislative succession presents some perverse incentives.  If the 
leader of the House or Senate is next in line to the Presidency, legislators 
may have a disincentive to confirm a vice presidential nominee or may have 
an incentive to impeach a President or Vice President.361 
These structural arguments, which derive largely from the architecture of 
the original Constitution, raise more serious objections to legislative 
succession.  Yet a subsequent amendment to the Constitution introduces 
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 358. When Vice President Thomas Hendricks died in 1885, Congress was not in session 
and no Senate President pro tempore or Speaker of the House existed. FEERICK, supra note 8, 
at 141.  Accordingly, there was no successor to President Grover Cleveland.  Since the 
House was not a continuing body and did not meet until the winter following a presidential 
inauguration and since the Senate President pro tempore was not a continuing position in an 
age when the Vice President generally presided over the Senate, this situation often existed 
at the beginning of a presidential term. 
 359. See Amar & Amar, supra note 341, at 114 (“Our most important reasoning is 
structural . . . .”); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 87–88; see also Wasserman, supra note 341, at 
348–52 (discussing structural principles). 
 360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). 
 361. Amar & Amar, supra note 341, at 124; see also Goldstein, supra note 1, at 87–89. 
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additional evidence that merits consideration in assessing the strength of 
these arguments.362 
If neither a President-Elect nor Vice President-Elect qualifies, the 
Twentieth Amendment authorizes Congress to determine what “person” 
shall act as President or to identify a means to select such a person.  
Although Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment363 is poorly crafted,364 the 
legislative history makes it clear that Congress’s power to designate such a 
“person” or system extends to a situation in which Congress fails to choose 
a President and Vice President365 or in which both die or they fail to qualify 
for any other reason.366  The designated “person” serves only until a 
President or Vice President qualifies. 
“Person” is, of course, broader than “Officer of the United States” or 
even “Officer” and accordingly Congress might designate as acting 
President under a Twentieth Amendment contingency someone who would 
not fall within those other terms, such as the most recent former President 
of the United States or the Dean of the Fordham Law School.  The use of 
“person” avoids the textual and originalist arguments that have been made 
against legislative succession based on the argument that “Officer” means 
“Officer of the United States” in the Presidential Succession Clause.  Yet 
 
 362. See generally Goldstein, supra note 1, at 89–90 (presenting similar argument). 
 363. It provides in part: 
If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of 
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice 
President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the 
Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a 
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, 
or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall 
act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XX. 
 364. The separate reference in the first clause of Section 3 above to situations in which a 
President is not chosen or a President-Elect fails to qualify suggests that the former concept 
(failure of election) is not included in the latter (failure to qualify).  Since the Amendment 
authorizes Congress to designate a “person” to act as President when neither a President nor 
Vice President qualifies but is silent regarding a failure to elect, one might conclude that 
there is no constitutional provision for the failure to elect situation. 
 365. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-633, at 3–4 (1932) (conference report adopting the broader 
formulation of failure to qualify in the House’s proposed amendment); H.R. REP. NO. 72-
345, at 2 (1932) (“Congress is given power to provide for the case where neither a President 
nor a Vice President has qualified before the time fixed for the beginning of the term, 
whether the failure of both to qualify is occasioned by the death of both, [by the failure to 
elect], or by any other cause . . . .”); id. at 4 (“Under our present Constitution there is no 
provision for the case where the House of Representatives fails to choose a President and the 
Senate fails to choose a Vice President.  Section 3 of the proposed amendment authorizes 
Congress to provide for this situation.  Power is given to Congress to provide by law who 
shall act as President in such case or the manner of selecting a person to act as 
President . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 72-26, at 5 (1932) (“Section 3 of the proposed amendment 
gives Congress the power to provide by law who shall act as President in a case where the 
election of a President has been thrown into the House of Representatives and the House has 
failed to elect a President . . . .”).  
 366. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 2 (“Congress is given power to provide for the case 
where neither a President nor a Vice President has qualified before the time fixed for the 
beginning of the term, whether the failure of both to qualify is occasioned by the death of 
both, [by the failure to elect], or by any other cause . . . .”). 
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the “person” designated would be subject to other constitutional 
qualifications—age, residency, natural born citizen367—and the 
arrangement would be subject to considerations based on constitutional 
structure, too.  In other words, the structural principles that would impeach 
legislative succession could also be deployed against legislative succession 
in the failure to qualify context. 
In fact, the Presidential Succession Law of 1947 identifies the Speaker, 
then the President pro tempore, as the “person(s)” who act as President in 
failure to qualify situations.368  Yet many of the structural arguments that 
seemed forceful when discussed in the post-inauguration context369 would, 
if valid, undermine the Speaker’s succession here, too.  Congress would be 
electing the acting President, thereby resembling parliamentary 
government, and, at least when the failure to qualify was due to the failure 
of the House and Senate to elect a President and Vice President, 
respectively, either house could abbreviate his or her tenure by electing a 
President or Vice President.  The Incompatibility Clause arguments would 
also apply.  If a legislative leader acted as President, his or her presence at 
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue would seem to violate the clause.  And 
the houses of Congress might have less incentive to elect a President or 
Vice President in the contingency election since it could instead have the 
Speaker act as Chief Executive.  The Speaker would owe her status as 
acting President to the House, or at least the majority who elected her.  The 
House (or the Senate) would be able to remove her for actions of which it 
disapproved by electing a President or Vice President.370 
Yet some form of legislative succession seems virtually inevitable in a 
Twentieth Amendment scenario.  There are no other dependable options.  
Succession of Cabinet officers here is generally not a feasible choice.  The 
only Cabinet is likely to be that which served with the prior President.  Its 
members may have been appointed eight years earlier by a President whose 
positions might have become widely unpopular.  Absent the remote case in 
which a President and Vice President were re-elected and then died before 
the inauguration, succession of a Cabinet member would defy many of the 
principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—continuity, 
accountability, and democratic pedigree.  If the electoral system failed to 
produce a President, elevating someone from the prior Cabinet would make 
little sense for all of these reasons.  If the President-Elect died after 
defeating the incumbent President, succession from the outgoing Cabinet 
would turn the executive branch over to the team that had just been ousted, 
an even more outrageous result!  Continuing the outgoing President would 
 
 367. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a 
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not 
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the 
United States.”). 
 368. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (a)(1), (d)(1) (2006). 
 369. See supra text at notes 359–61. 
 370. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 91. 
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seem even more anomalous, especially if he or she had just been defeated 
by a President-Elect who had then died. 
If these structural arguments from the original Constitution are deal 
breakers as against the Speaker it is hard to imagine who might be a 
plausible President in a double “failure to qualify” situation.371  But that 
cannot be the proper resolution.  The Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall 
said in McCulloch v. Maryland,372 was designed to succeed, not fail, and, 
where possible, it should be interpreted in a manner to facilitate that goal.373  
That recognition might lead one to conclude that these structural 
considerations must yield in the failure to qualify situation.  Yet it would 
seem anomalous to conclude that the structural arguments preclude 
legislative succession when a double vacancy occurs post-inauguration but 
can be brushed aside in the event of a double failure to qualify.374 
Alternatively, one might conclude that these structural considerations 
reflect important, but not absolute, constitutional values which sometimes 
must be weighed against, and even yield to, other considerations.  The 
double failure to qualify scenario presents one such situation but a post-
inaugural double vacancy may present another.  This approach does not 
mean that these structural arguments should be disregarded but simply that 
they should be considered as part of a mix of arguments in reaching an 
acceptable resolution in the post- and pre-inaugural settings.375 
Moreover, the constitutional arguments regarding the merits of legislative 
and Cabinet succession need not rely simply on conventional implications 
from the structure of the original Constitution.  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment presents additional structural considerations with reference to 
the double vacancy situation.  The values implicit in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment included the need for a smooth succession of a new leader who 
was conversant with the activities of the executive branch.  Succession of 
the Speaker or President pro tempore would be disruptive even when it 
 
 371. Other possibilities (e.g., a former President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
the most senior governor, etc.) present self-evident problems.  Instead of designating a 
“person” to act as President, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment allows Congress to 
designate “the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XX.  Congress could, for instance, empower itself (or one of its chambers) to elect an acting 
President from all of those who would be constitutionally eligible.  This procedure might 
facilitate the selection of a presidential stand-in but would not escape some of the other 
problems of legislative election, and, in a failure to elect situation, would add yet another 
contingent election to the burden on Congress. 
 372. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 373. See id. at 415. 
 374. Of course, legislative succession does not need to overcome the textual and 
originalist arguments related to “Officer” in the failure to qualify situation since the 
Twentieth Amendment allows Congress to designate a “person.”  Yet unless one views these 
arguments as dispositive, and many of those who advance them do not, see, e.g., Amar & 
Amar, supra note 341, at 114 (describing structural arguments as most significant); Feerick, 
supra note 341, at 61–64 (describing controversy regarding textual and originalist arguments 
but expressing willingness to accept “legal risks” of legislative succession but for 
“compelling policy reasons” against legislative succession), ultimately the constitutionality 
of legislative succession turns on structural constitutional arguments. 
 375. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 91–92. 
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would not change the party control of the executive branch.  For different 
reasons, either would be hard-pressed to play the understudy role 
envisioned by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  If the double (or triple 
vacancy) happened simultaneously or in rapid sequence, there would be no 
time for a legislative leader to become conversant with deliberations on 
matters of concern. 
Disability determinations would be complicated, especially regarding 
short-term situations.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was premised on the 
belief that, when an unexpected injury or illness mandates a transfer of 
presidential power, it must occur immediately without any hiatus or 
uncertainty. The 1947 law, however, requires resignation of the legislative 
leader, and some conclude that the Incompatibility Clause or other 
considerations mandate that a legislative leader, though not a Cabinet 
officer, relinquish his or her prior office to act as President.376  This 
requirement could create a situation in which a Speaker or President pro 
tempore might wish to collect information regarding the expected length of 
the incapacity and the risks the country faces to decide whether to act as 
President or let the responsibility pass to the next in line. 
Moreover, enthusiasm for the Vice President as successor was premised 
in part on the close relationship she would have with the President.  That 
frequent contact would provide information regarding the President’s 
condition, which a Speaker, particularly one from the opposite party, would 
lack.  Sections 3 and 4 assumed that the President and Vice President would 
have a largely shared political destiny, a circumstance that would facilitate 
inability transfers.  That would not be true of the President and a Speaker, 
especially a President and a cross party Speaker. 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were predicated on the 
belief that the executive branch should initiate disability determinations.  
Even if Congress replaced the Cabinet with some other body, the Vice 
President, a close presidential associate, would remain a necessary actor and 
hold an effective veto over such proceedings.  Legislative succession would 
jeopardize, and perhaps undermine that basic premise.  In the absence of a 
Vice President, it would deny the executive branch the power to control the 
initiation of a transfer of power. 
Although legislative succession in general runs afoul of some principles 
implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Cabinet succession does as well, 
although in less severe ways.  The earlier discussion showed why Cabinet 
succession is not a feasible approach in most failure to qualify situations.  
 
 376. The general view of scholars is that the Presidential Succession Clause intended the 
“Officer” who acts as President to retain her current office. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 8, 
at 268; Amar & Amar, supra note 341, at 119–21.  This presents problems for a legislative 
leader, based upon the Incompatibility Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers.  I am 
not convinced that the Constitution requires that an acting President retain their prior office.  
The use of the word “Officer” may simply designate the status of those who are eligible to 
serve as acting President when they assume the discharge of presidential powers and duties 
without requiring that they retain that position.  Indeed, if a Secretary of State were called 
upon to act as President for an extended period of time, she might well wish to relinquish 
that position in order to enlist a full time Secretary of State. 
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Moreover, a Cabinet member may lack the democratic pedigree that the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment envisions for a presidential successor.  Although 
he or she may, in a sense, reflect the outcome of the presidential election 
and would have attained office based on the advice and consent of the 
Senate, a Cabinet member would not have undergone the more rigorous 
Section 2 process and perhaps would never have run for office.  A 
legislative leader does not stand on the same sort of national electoral 
foundation as a President, but he or she has at least been elected multiple 
times by constituents and by party members in the House or Senate who 
have recognized his or her political leadership.377 
Further, a Cabinet member could encounter one difficulty in disability 
determinations that a legislative leader would not experience.  A President 
might be able to prevent an adverse decision under Section 4 by removing 
the Cabinet member who was first in line after the Vice President if that 
member expressed concerns regarding the President’s capacity.  He or she 
could not do so with a legislative leader. 
Structural arguments that are implicit in the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth 
Amendments, as well as those from the original Constitution, expose some 
of the obstacles to legislative succession.  Cabinet succession encounters 
problems, too, although to a lesser degree.  Although I would not be 
prepared to conclude that either is always unconstitutional, both, in their 
generic versions, present constitutional challenges.  Legislative succession 
as currently constructed poses two additional problems that violate basic 
principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  These deserve further 
discussion. 
1.  The Perils of Cross-Party Succession 
Legislative succession could work a shift in party control of the White 
House, a situation that would cause unique upheavals in the system of 
government.  The current system of legislative succession runs a significant 
risk of cross-party transfer of power.  Since 1969, the President and Speaker 
of the House have come from opposite parties, twenty-eight of the forty-
two years or two-thirds of the time.378  Six of the eight Presidents during 
this time (i.e., all but Carter and Barack Obama) served all or part of their 
Presidency with a Speaker from the opposite party.379 
 
 
 
 
 
 377. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing political pedigree of legislative 
leaders). 
 378. See infra tbl. 1.  These calculations run through January 2011 or the first two years 
of the Obama term.  
 379. See infra tbl. 1. 
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Table 1:  Presidents and Speakers of the House, 1969–2011380 
 
Years President (Party) Speaker (Party) 
1969–1974 Nixon (R) McCormack (D), 
Albert (D)
1974–1977 Ford (R) Albert (D)
1977–1981 Carter (D) O’Neill (D)
1981–1989 Reagan (R) O’Neill (D), 
Wright (D)
1989–1993 Bush (R) Wright (D), 
Foley(D)
1993–1995 Clinton (D) Foley (D)
1995–2001 Clinton (D) Gingrich (R),  
Hastert (R)
2001–2007 Bush (R) Hastert (R)
2007–2009 Bush (R) Pelosi (D)
2009–2011 Obama (D) Pelosi (D)
 
A cross-party succession of a Speaker would present unprecedented 
challenges, which would violate any number of the principles that animated 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Any succession of a Speaker would be an 
anomalous event that would almost certainly occur in a time of significant 
national trauma.  The dislocation associated with a presidential succession 
that shifted party control of the executive branch would increase 
exponentially.  Some would question the legitimacy of such a turnover of 
party control, which, in contemporary times, would produce a dramatic 
change in the ideological orientation as well as partisan composition of the 
executive branch.  Such legitimacy concerns would be particularly acute in 
those cases where party control shifted after a presidential election that was 
won decisively, as would have been true following the presidential elections 
of 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1996.381 
Although a time of national trauma might cushion partisan impulses, the 
change in the party and policy orientation of the person discharging 
presidential powers would likely work an upheaval of executive personnel.  
One exercising presidential powers and duties would wish to surround 
himself with subordinates whose judgment he trusted, whose loyalty to him 
was clear, and whose worldview was compatible.  It is hard to imagine 
acting President Tip O’Neill retaining Reagan’s associates or Tom Foley 
 
 380. The information in this Table was compiled from publicly available sources. See 
Speakers of the House, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/speakers.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); 
The Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2010). 
 381. See Presidential Elections, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/elections.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (providing 
election results). 
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keeping George H.W. Bush’s appointees in place or Nancy Pelosi 
governing with those George W. Bush had chosen.  Nor could one envision 
Newt Gingrich or Denny Hastert retaining the Clinton Cabinet and White 
House personnel.  The lack of any built-in transition period would 
exacerbate the problem.  Whereas most new Presidents have ten weeks 
between election and inauguration (and a longer period in which transition 
planning occurs), a Speaker who replaces a President of the opposing party 
would have no advance time to plan for such a turnover. 
It is unlikely that a cross-party Speaker would have had a desirable level 
of preparation.  Even if she received briefings, it is hard to imagine the prior 
administration bringing an opposing party’s Speaker into deliberations on 
sensitive policy matters. 
Finally, a cross-party situation would introduce new complications into a 
disability situation.  One would expect a President or those around the 
President to be more hesitant to transfer powers to a Speaker from the other 
party. 
The prospect of a cross-party succession accordingly presents 
complications that offend a number of values that are implicit in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Rather than achieving governmental continuity 
by elevating the President’s chosen successor, it installs the legislative 
leader of the opposing party.  Rather than elevating a successor whose 
relationship with the President was likely to foster benefits flowing from 
intimate involvement in the pursuit of governmental policies, it dispenses 
with those advantages by promoting a leading opponent.  Rather than 
facilitating disability determinations, it exacerbates them.  In all of these 
ways, cross-party succession conflicts with principles inherent in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
2.  Succession of the President Pro Tempore:  An Unpresidential Acting 
President 
Placement of the President pro tempore of the Senate in the line of 
succession is even more offensive to ideas implicit in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  It presents the same risks of succession of a Speaker, 
especially a cross-party Speaker.  Cross-party control of the Senate has been 
a less common, but still frequent, recent condition, having existed twenty-
three and a half of the last forty-two years, or fifty-six percent of the 
time.382 
Succession of the President pro tempore of the Senate violates a second 
basic principle of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—the idea that a successor 
should be presidential.  That requirement which the Amendment imposed 
for a Vice President would also seem to be applicable to a President pro 
 
 382. Since 1969, the Presidency and Senate have been controlled by different parties from 
1969–77, 1987–93, 1995–2001, June 6, 2001–November 12, 2002, 2007–2009. See Party 
Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); supra tbl. 1 
(providing dates of presidential service). 
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tempore who would necessarily act as President under unprecedented 
circumstances. 
Two criteria govern selection as President pro tempore of the Senate—
membership in the Senate majority party and seniority.  Whereas the 
Speaker has been chosen to lead the House of Representatives and its 
majority party, the President pro tempore is an honorific position.  Since 
Nixon’s inauguration, ten men have served as President pro tempore.  Their 
names, dates of service, and age at the beginning of each stint, are presented 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Ages of Senate President Pro Tempores, 1969–2011383 
 
President pro tempore Dates of Service Age at Beginning 
of Term 
Richard B. Russell   1/3/1969–1/21/1971 71
Allen J. Ellender 1/22/1971–7/27/1972 80
James O. Eastland 7/28/1972–12/27/1978 67
Warren G. Magnuson 1/15/1979–12/4/1980 73
 12/6/1980–1/4/1981 75
Milton R. Young 12/5/1980 82
Strom Thurmond 1/5/1981–1/6/1987 78
 1/4/1995–1/3/2001 92
 1/20/2001–6/6/2001 98
John C. Stennis 1/6/1987–1/2/1989 85
Robert C. Byrd 1/3/1989–1/3/1995 71
 1/3/2001–1/20/2001 83
 6/6/2001–1/3/2003 83
 1/4/2007–6/28/2010 89
Ted Stevens 1/3/2003–1/4/2007 79
Daniel K. Inouye 6/28/2010–1/2011 85
 
It is hard to imagine that many Senators who voted to elect these ten men 
as President pro tempore would have wanted them to serve as President, 
especially during a time of crisis.  Of the group, only Russell and Thurmond 
had ever run for President,384 Russell more than sixteen years before he 
became President pro tempore, and Thurmond, as a third-party candidate, 
thirty-two years before he first became President pro tempore.  Indeed, 
 
 383. The information in this Table was compiled from publicly available sources. See 
Complete List of Presidents Pro Tempore, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/President_Pro_Tempore.htm#
5 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Congressional Biographical Directory, U.S. CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (providing 
biographies, including dates of birth, of members of Congress). 
 384. See Paul P. Kennedy, Russell of Georgia to Run Regardless of Truman Decision, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1952, at 1; 1948 Presidential Election, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1948 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
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Thurmond was still serving as President pro tempore more than one half 
century after he ran for the Presidency!  None of the ten, in their prime or 
when they served as President pro tempore, ever had any chance to win his 
party’s presidential nomination.385 
Inasmuch as seniority is the crucial credential to become President pro 
tempore, not surprisingly virtually all of those who have held the office 
since 1969 were from non-competitive states not known for producing 
presidential or even vice presidential candidates.386  Virtually all were 
beyond the age at which Presidents have been elected; Thurmond served at 
ninety-eight, Byrd at ninety-two, and five others served in their eighties.387  
Russell, Ellender, and Byrd died in office, and Thurmond and Byrd had 
significant health problems.  Magnuson was defeated for re-election.  
Eastland, Young, and Stennis retired as, or within a month of serving as, 
President pro tempore.  Stennis could not hear and had lost a leg to cancer. 
The placement of the President pro tempore of the Senate after the Vice 
President and Speaker of the House puts three heartbeats from the 
Presidency someone who is inherently unpresidential.  Such an arrangement 
is simply unconscionable if one takes seriously the possibility of the 
simultaneous deaths or inability of higher ranking officials.388 
C.  Mass Catastrophe Problems:  The Need for and Perils of a Long Line 
Although the Constitution empowers Congress to designate an “Officer” 
to act as President in case of a double vacancy,389 Congress has always 
designated multiple successors.  The current line, eighteen persons long 
beginning with the Vice President, places the members of the Cabinet after 
the Speaker and Senate President pro tempore based upon the date of 
creation of the various Cabinet offices.  Prudence, of course, dictates a long 
line especially in an age of nuclear weapons and terrorism. 
The logic of an eighteen person line is to guard against a mass 
catastrophe.  Yet a long line does not assure presidential continuity, 
especially if all of those in line live or work near each other.  Everyone in 
the current line works in Washington, D.C. within a few miles of each 
other.  It is not difficult to imagine a disaster that would eliminate all or 
most of them.390  The current line, long though it is, does not serve its basic 
mission in part due to its geographic concentration. 
 
 385. Russell, however, might have been a plausible running mate for Adlai Stevenson in 
1952; Byrd had been elected majority leader and Stevens, minority whip. 
 386. The nine states that produced the ten Presidents pro tempore since 1969 have 
provided one President (Jimmy Carter, 1976) and two unsuccessful vice presidential 
candidates (Henry Davis, 1904; and Sarah Palin, 2008) since the twentieth century began. 
 387. See supra tbl. 2. 
 388. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 40; Feerick, supra note 341, at 
63–64; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 94. 
 389. A strict constructionist might complain that Congress has exceeded its powers by 
designating multiple people when the Constitution empowers it to name a single “officer.”   
Any such challenge seems frivolous. 
 390. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 39; FEERICK, supra note 8, at 
275 (“It is conceivable that, since all of those persons who are presently in the line of 
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In addition, the current arrangement also presents a “what’s my line?” 
problem.  A premise of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was that not any 
successor would do.  Although it would be unduly optimistic to expect 
those in remote positions in the line of succession (or even those near its 
top) to have the attributes of a Vice President, it is not unreasonable to think 
that some of the principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment would 
be reflected in constructing the line.  Yet the current line includes many 
offices that are filled with able public servants who are ill-suited to act as 
President, particularly under the circumstances in which such service might 
be required.  Would the typical Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development or of Transportation or of countless other departments really 
be equipped to make the sort of immediate national security judgments that 
a down-line successor would almost inevitably be called on to make?  The 
lack of expertise and unfamiliarity with basic concepts and vocabulary in 
that area would make such a successor largely dependent on whatever 
bureaucratic and military advisers remained. 
Moreover, most Americans probably would not recognize, and could not 
name, those manning most positions in the line of succession.  Would such 
figures have the credibility to command public support under the sort of 
unprecedented circumstances that would occasion their succession?  And 
would they have the political experience and skills? 
The current long line was drafted in a formulaic manner that was not 
sensitive to its fundamental mission, to produce an able acting President 
following some mass catastrophe.  The current line owes its length and 
composition to the simplistic practice of including the head of every 
Cabinet-level department.391  This formal approach to decision making 
ignores basic points like the common vulnerability of those in the line to an 
attack on Washington or the lack of suitability to be President of most in 
line, particularly under the extenuating circumstances under which such a 
person might be called upon to act as President. 
D.  The Disability Gap 
Since Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment refer specifically 
to the Vice President as the recipient of presidential powers and duties and, 
under Section 4, co-decider of presidential inability, the absence or 
 
succession spend much time in Washington, D.C., the whole line could be wiped out in a 
nuclear attack on that city.  Hence, in view of this possibility, it would be advisable for 
Congress to give some consideration to extending the line of succession to persons in widely 
separated parts of the country.”); MCDERMOTT, supra note 21, at 218 (calling for 
arrangements which recognize the possibility of attack on Washington, D.C.). 
 391. Some have suggested that the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19 
(2006), would allow an acting Secretary to claim a place in line after the secretary leaves 
office.  It lists the Cabinet positions chronologically, see id. § 19(d)(1), and provides that it 
“shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, 
of the President pro tempore.” Id. § 19(e).  The Continuity of Government Commission has 
concluded that “the language clearly permits acting secretaries to be placed in the line of 
succession.” See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 34. 
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incapacity of that officer would compromise those provisions.  There is no 
stated procedure to declare a Vice President disabled or to declare a 
President disabled absent a functioning Vice President.  Although the Vice 
President now performs important duties in the executive branch, the 
purpose of declaring him or her disabled is not to transfer those ongoing 
duties to someone else, something the President could, to some extent, 
accomplish by formal or informal order.392  It is rather to allow a President 
to be declared disabled without transferring the powers to the disabled Vice 
President and without his or her participation. 
Congress has power to provide by statute for a double vacancy due to 
some combination of presidential and vice presidential death, resignation, 
removal, and inability.393  It could legislate procedures, like those in 
Sections 3 and 4, to handle a presidential disability when the Vice 
Presidency was vacant.  Absent such legislation, the President and the 
person next in line, currently the Speaker, could enter into a letter 
agreement regarding a voluntary or involuntary transfer of power when the 
second office was vacant.  The Tyler Precedent should not complicate this 
matter since Tyler made a claim on behalf of a Vice President in a situation 
in which the Constitution was ambiguous.  The Constitution clearly states 
that any officer after the Vice President simply acts as President, but does 
not assume the office, and that the President resumes power when the 
disability ends.  The agreement between President Johnson and Speaker 
McCormack would provide some precedent for this arrangement.394 
A disabled Vice President could present a greater predicament.  Since the 
point of declaring the Vice President disabled is to facilitate a transfer of 
power from a disabled President or to direct presidential powers and duties 
to someone other than the disabled Vice President, Congress would seem to 
have power under Article II, Section I, Clause 6 to construct a means to 
declare the Vice President disabled.  Sections 3 and 4 might serve as a 
general guide even though the relationships between a Vice President and 
the person next in line, and between the Vice President and Cabinet, differ 
in some material ways from the relationships between the President and the 
officials those provisions empower.  As suggested previously, the 
placement of the Speaker next in line introduces difficulties.  Moreover, the 
complications regarding disability determinations proliferate in a mass 
disaster event.395 
 
 392. Even so, the Vice President would remain the President of the Senate and thereby 
entitled to preside over the Senate and break any tie votes.  The specter of a deranged Vice 
President insisting on performing these tasks, which all Vice Presidents routinely ignore, 
seems somewhat far-fetched.  The Constitution provides for a Senate President pro tempore 
to preside in the Vice President’s absence and perhaps the Senate could, by rule, govern a 
Vice President’s ability to preside in such situations, a question beyond the scope of this 
discussion. 
 393. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 394. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 71–72. 
 395. A mass catastrophe could leave some members of the line de facto disabled.  That 
contingency could present problems in identifying the acting President (a problem which 
could also exist if many were killed).  Moreover, the death or disability of many in the line 
of succession would make it difficult to declare a President disabled or, assuming Section 4 
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E.  Failure To Qualify 
“Failure to qualify” covers several contingencies, each of which poses a 
distinct problem.  A double failure to qualify396 would include the death of 
the President-Elect and Vice President-Elect, the failure to elect someone to 
either office, or any other failure of a President-Elect and Vice President-
Elect to meet the qualifications that are prerequisites for taking office.  Each 
presents a remote risk,397 yet they raise contingencies that are more 
susceptible to resolution before the immediate partisan consequences of 
different solutions become apparent.398 
 
were extended to disability of the Vice President or others who might act as President, to 
declare those officers disabled. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 17–24, 
41.  If the catastrophe affected Congress, as it very well might, Sections 3 and especially 4 
might also be impacted.  Although most states allow governors to make temporary 
appointments to fill Senate vacancies, vacancies in the House of Representatives can only be 
filled by election. See generally CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 7.   
 396. Failure to qualify only of the President-Elect would produce the succession of the 
Vice President-Elect. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. 
 397. A double failure to elect would seem unlikely.  Although the contingent election in 
the House is structured so that deadlock is conceivable—voting is by states (with each state 
casting a single vote) among the three highest Electoral College finishers with a majority 
required, see id. amend. XII (“[A]nd if no person have such majority [of electoral votes], 
then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those 
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the 
President.  But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a 
member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be 
necessary to a choice.”)—the Senate is likely to elect a Vice President since each Senator 
casts an individual vote for one of the highest two vice presidential electoral vote recipients. 
See id. (“[I]f no person have a majority [of electoral votes], then from the two highest 
numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose 
shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole 
number shall be necessary to a choice.”).  The double failure to elect would require no 
presidential or vice presidential candidate to receive an Electoral College majority followed 
by failure of the House and Senate to elect a President and Vice President, respectively.  Yet 
a double death or some combination of death and failure to elect could occur. 
 398. There is a range of continuity problems that could arise during the pre-inauguration 
period which are beyond the scope of this paper.  These include acts or events (terrorism, 
natural disasters, etc.) which might disrupt the presidential campaign or deaths or disabilities 
of presidential or vice presidential candidates.  The existence of the Electoral College 
introduces other complications in part because it postpones identification of the President-
Elect and Vice President-Elect.  The death of a President-Elect-to-be between election day 
and the meeting of the Electors may produce a different result than the death of the 
President-Elect after the Electors meet or the votes are counted.  Finally, although the 
Constitution empowers Congress to provide for the death of one of the candidates in a 
contingent election for President or Vice President, see U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4 (“The 
Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the 
House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have 
devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the 
Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon 
them.”), Congress has not done so.  For a discussion of some of these issues, see Amar, 
supra note 1, at 12–16, 24–26; Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death:  
Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1995); Goldstein, supra 
note 1, at 72–77. 
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Although, as previously discussed, a legislative line of successors seems 
virtually inevitable in these situations,399 the double failure to elect and 
double death contingencies still raise some quite different concerns.  In a 
double death situation, the current regime of legislative succession presents 
a serious risk that the successor would not be viewed as a legitimate head of 
the executive branch if a Speaker from the party that had just lost the 
presidential election was installed for a four-year term.400  Elevation of a 
cross-party Speaker would infringe the party continuity principle of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  That basic objective would not be offended if a 
Speaker from the prevailing party were designated. 
In a failure to elect situation, party continuity diminishes or vanishes as a 
concern since, by definition, no party has prevailed in the election.  This 
contingency presents different problems.  Any acting President will serve 
only until a President or Vice President qualifies.  Accordingly, the tenure 
of the acting President could depend upon his or her willingness to 
accommodate congressional preferences; failure to do so might cause the 
acting President to be “bumped” from the Presidency.  Congressmen would 
bargain with the acting President (and candidates for President and Vice 
President) with the Presidency itself part of the political currency.  
Members of the House from deadlocked or closely divided states and 
Senators would have leverage and could barter their vote in the contingent 
election for concessions.  The corrupting stench of rampant political pork 
would not be the only negative consequence.  This situation would 
introduce features of parliamentary government that are at odds with the 
principles of separation of powers that generally influence the structure of 
government.  Whereas normally Congress can remove a President only 
through impeachment, which requires action by each house (with a 
supermajority needed in the Senate) based on a violation of a constitutional 
norm, here either house could unilaterally terminate an acting President.  
The situation would resemble a parliamentary system except the acting 
President would be even more at risk since members of the House or Senate 
could replace the acting President without putting their own positions in 
immediate jeopardy. 
This vulnerability to “bumping,” and the associated pressures, is not 
unique to legislative successors.  It is part of the constitutional design to 
which any acting President would be subject in a failure to elect situation.  
Under the Twentieth Amendment, the term of an acting President, pending 
election of a President or Vice President, ends when a President-Elect or 
Vice President-Elect qualifies.401  Nonetheless, legislative succession raises 
distinctive concerns in the failure to elect situation.  It allows the House and 
 
 399. The current law which governs succession generally applies also to failure to qualify 
situations. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). 
 400. Decisive presidential victories in 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1996 each were 
accompanied by the other party (the Democrats in the first four elections, the Republicans in 
the fifth) maintaining control of the House and Speakership.  Accordingly, in those 
instances, death of the President-Elect and Vice President-Elect would have installed an 
acting President from the party just rejected in the presidential balloting. 
 401. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. 
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Senate respectively to determine unilaterally the identity of the person who 
provides the alternative to the candidates for President and Vice President 
that the Electoral College provides.  Moreover, elevation of the Speaker 
would create some perverse incentives.  It would diminish the interest of the 
House to elect a President from the three who had received the most 
electoral votes. 
Public opinion would presumably remain as a check in this situation.  
Political figures who misbehaved would be politically vulnerable.  At some 
point, the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reasoned, public 
officials must be trusted to act in a proper, rather than wholly partisan, 
fashion in order for any set of procedures to succeed.402  In these situations, 
the sense of “constitutional morality” and the political sanction of the 
outrage of an engaged citizenry might afford the most efficacious restraints. 
Bumping problems would not exist in the double death situation.  The 
legislative leader designated to act as President would not be vulnerable to 
being supplanted since the two figures higher on the ladder, the President-
Elect and Vice President-Elect, were deceased.  There would be some 
question regarding the wisdom of having someone act as President for four 
years without being able to trace his or her position directly to a national 
election.403  The case for a special presidential election seems strongest in 
the pre-inaugural double death situation.404 
F.  Changing the Line 
The foregoing discussion suggests several conclusions regarding the 
system for ensuring presidential continuity after the Vice Presidency.  First, 
the current regime contains any number of accidents waiting to happen.  
Although the contingencies are each relatively remote, many could present 
formidable challenges if they did occur. 
Second, the current system to handle succession after the Vice President 
offers simplistic solutions to complicated problems.  It offers blunt 
instruments to address a range of entirely different contingencies with little 
regard to whether those remedies are designed to handle the assignment 
given.  The various problems do not lend themselves to a single fix.  The 
current system rests on three fallacies:  the single solution fallacy, the idea 
that the same legislative (or Cabinet) line of succession should apply to 
each of the quite different contingencies that could create a double vacancy; 
the symmetry fallacy, the idea that if the presiding officer of one house is 
included in the line of succession that of the other house should be, and that 
if some Cabinet members are included, all should be; and the strength in 
numbers fallacy, the idea that if a line is long enough it does not matter that 
it never leaves Washington, D.C.  The formulaic nature of the current 
approach—the Speaker succeeds in all contingencies, the line gets its length 
 
 402. See supra Part II.A.10. 
 403. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 1, at 1009–10. 
 404. The failure to elect situation is somewhat similar, except one might wonder about the 
wisdom of trying to resolve an inconclusive election with another nationwide vote. 
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by adding each Cabinet member—is easy to conceive and apply but 
produces bad solutions in many instances.  In so doing, it conflicts with the 
approach of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which reflected a strong 
preference for flexibility and for tailored responses to specific problems 
based on deliberation and data assessment.  Unlike those who drew the 
current line of successors after the Vice President, the framers of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought that presidential continuity was not a 
function of simply providing a successor but one who was knowledgeable 
regarding the central challenges he or she would face, presidential, in 
harmony with the President, and possessed with some legitimacy.405 
Third, neither legislative nor Cabinet succession yields an entirely 
satisfactory solution.  Legislative succession offends the separation of 
powers concerns and often, the party continuity principle of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment; Cabinet succession may advance someone lacking in 
democratic sensibility. 
Fourth, many of the problems are interrelated and solutions must go 
beyond simply creating a legislative or Cabinet line.  The ability of the 
system to address the disability of a Vice President or presidential inability 
absent a Vice President, depends in part on the identity of those in the line 
of succession.  Disability and death cannot entirely be separated because the 
former may lead to the latter.  Similarly, pre-inaugural and post-inaugural 
approaches must be synchronized and must account for timing issues.  
Whereas legislative leaders can be identified when Congress convenes in 
early January, Cabinet members must be nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate and accordingly do not take office until after the 
inauguration. 
On balance, Congress would meet many of the goals of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment by replacing the current legislative-Cabinet line of succession 
with a modified Cabinet line except in the failure to qualify context where, 
for reasons stated earlier, Cabinet succession is impractical.  The continuity 
and separation of powers objectives more likely would be achieved in a 
system of Cabinet succession.  Part of the logic behind involving the 
Cabinet in the disability determination was the perceived identification of 
its members with the President and their knowledge of, and commitment to, 
his or her goals and programs.  That rationale also speaks to their 
credentials to be in the line of succession.  Presidents might be more likely 
to choose presidential persons with a democratic pedigree for senior 
Cabinet positions if such a line were adopted although there are no 
guarantees.406 
 
 405. See supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 406. A Cabinet line would be preferable to creating an Assistant Vice President to follow 
the constitutional Vice President.  The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment wisely 
rejected a two Vice Presidents solution, in part because they did not want to arrest the 
development of the existing office by creating a competitor and in part because they feared 
that the second Vice Presidency would attract lesser figures.  Inasmuch as the Vice 
Presidency is now one of the success stories of American political institutions, it would be 
ill-advised to threaten its trajectory by creating by statute an Assistant Vice President. 
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A shift to Cabinet succession would, of course, require congressional 
approval.  History suggests that such a change is unlikely.  Congress has 
generally favored legislative succession.  Indeed, it only passed the 1886 
Succession Law to avoid the risk a legislative line posed that a presidential 
or vice presidential death while Congress was not in session could leave the 
nation without any presidential successor.  That precarious situation had 
occurred twice in five years during the 1880s and those crises forced 
Congress’s hand.407  Nor did Cabinet succession gain traction when Bayh 
proposed it in the mid-1960s.  Far from it.  If the past is prologue, Congress 
is likely to prefer legislative succession, either based on the principled 
position that its leaders have a democratic pedigree, stature, and political 
skill or simply because it does not wish to abandon the successor role for its 
leaders.  If Congress’s past behavior anticipates its future disposition, an 
insistence on a Cabinet line of succession might preclude any reform. 
That would be unfortunate.  It would leave in place two indefensible 
features of the current regime:  the threat it often poses to party continuity 
of the executive branch and the risk of succession of an unpresidential 
successor in the Senate President pro tempore.  Those glaring defects 
offend principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Remedying 
them should be matters of absolute priority. 
Here, the strategic teachings from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment offer 
lessons worth learning.  The Amendment succeeded in part because its 
proponents were committed to the proposition that achieving partial, but 
significant, reform better served the nation than pursuing a more 
comprehensive, but politically unpalatable, package.  First they trimmed 
their goals, postponing some objectives (e.g., addressing the electoral 
problems and the line of succession after the Vice President) to remedy the 
most glaring defects.  Then, they were willing to strike compromises to 
reach agreement.  Those steps were crucial in transforming Bayh and his 
colleagues from advocates of Senate Joint Resolution 139 (or Senate Joint 
Resolution 1 or House Joint Resolution 1) to framers of a constitutional 
amendment. 
Consistent with that example, modern reformers might focus on these 
two paramount problems even at the cost of leaving some system of 
legislative succession in place.  An alternative approach to Cabinet 
succession would maintain a legislative-Cabinet line but modify it by 
placing the leader of the president’s party in the House atop the line of 
successors, not necessarily the Speaker when from the opposite party.  Such 
an approach would address some of the central objectives implicit in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  In particular, the continuity objective would be 
better served by eliminating the possibility that succession would change 
party control of the executive branch.408  Replacing the Senate President 
 
 407. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 130–32, 141–43 (discussing circumstances which 
twice produced no successor under the legislative succession system when the Vice 
Presidency was vacant). 
 408. See e.g., H.R. 3816, 107th Cong. (2002) (allowing the President to designate party’s 
leader in the House and Senate instead of a cross-party Speaker or President pro tempore of 
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pro tempore with the leader of the president’s party in the Senate would 
advance continuity objectives as well as the goal of providing a successor 
more likely to be presidential. 
Such changes would, of course, require that those congressional leaders 
be viewed as “officers” under Article II.  As a practical matter, Congress 
might enhance their standing by so designating them.409  This approach 
would still encounter some of the structural constitutional issues as does the 
current line, yet for the reasons stated earlier, these objections are not 
dispositive.  It seems likely that the Court would view a constitutional 
challenge based on them as presenting a political question410 although the 
Court’s resolution of Bush v. Gore411 reduces somewhat confidence in that 
prediction.  A bipartisan commitment to the merits of this compromise 
approach at a time when no crisis loomed would enhance its prospects of 
succeeding if it ever was tested. 
This resolution of the two (and three) heartbeats question is not as 
consistent with the principles behind the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as a 
system of Cabinet succession would be.  Yet it would represent a 
substantial improvement on the status quo, which offends the party 
continuity and presidential successor objectives of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment as well as its other defects. 
If it makes sense to have a line of successors to guard against a mass 
catastrophe (and of course it does), it also makes sense to draw that line in a 
rational fashion.  Most foreseeable contingencies that would implicate more 
remote successors would present national and homeland security issues.  
The line of successors should be redrawn in two respects.  It should include 
those Cabinet members with those sorts of expertise and involvement most 
likely to pertain to the circumstances that would occasion their 
succession—state, treasury, defense, justice, and homeland security—and it 
should include some “Officers” outside of Washington.412  Congress might 
designate certain officers whose work address is outside of Washington, 
D.C.—the Ambassador to the United Nations and perhaps certain foreign 
Ambassadors413—or it might create a number of new “Officers” and place 
them after those Cabinet members who would be retained in the line.414  
 
the Senate); see also Joel K. Goldstein, Succession Depression:  If Anything Should Happen, 
Guess Who’s in Charge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1995, at 15 (recommending succession by 
legislative leaders of president’s party). 
 409. As previously argued, the Twentieth Amendment which refers to “person” would be 
even more hospitable to this approach as applied to the failure to qualify of a President-Elect 
and Vice President-Elect. 
 410. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 155 (1995). 
 411. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that the contest over 
Florida’s electoral votes in the 2000 presidential election was a political question). 
 412. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 45. 
 413. See, e.g., H.R. 540, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing the addition of ambassadors to 
the United Nations, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France at the end of the succession 
line).  Further consideration, however, should be given to the wisdom of placing in the line 
of succession officers stationed abroad. 
 414. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 45. 
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Those figures might simply serve as wise men and women who would be 
briefed, who would be available to advise the President and serve as 
contingent successors.  If some of those designated lived outside 
Washington, such a change would address the continuity concern from a 
catastrophe, as well as providing a more presidential acting President 
following such an event. 
Failure to qualify contingencies also require tailored approaches.  
Succession of the Speaker may be as good a solution as any in the failure to 
elect scenario.  Yet when the failure to qualify is due to a double death, the 
legislative leader who succeeds should be from the same party as the 
President-Elect (or person who would have been President-Elect based on 
the election outcome).  That contingency may provide a compelling case for 
a special election. 
CONCLUSION:  THE TEACHINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment represented a substantial contribution to 
addressing long-standing and significant gaps in America’s system for 
ensuring presidential continuity.  The provisions it added to the Constitution 
represented prudent accommodations of often competing principles.  It has 
worked well and there is no reason why it should not continue to do so. 
Nonetheless, problems remain in existing arrangements.  The persistence 
of defects does not represent an oversight on the part of the framers of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment or an indictment of it.  They did not overlook the 
gaps they left untouched but were constrained by the incremental nature of 
the legislative process.  They recognized that an attempt to address all 
problems would solve none.  They wisely elected to improve on the status 
quo by addressing the most glaring issues while deferring action on others. 
Although the line of succession after the Vice President remains 
troubling in a number of respects discussed above, Congress has not 
returned to the matter in any serious way during the more than forty-three 
years since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified.  It should do so. 
In taking the next steps, Congress should draw from the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Like other parts of the Constitution, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment reflects constitutional principles and purposes that transcend 
its specific provisions.  Many of those principles provide structural 
constitutional arguments that should guide further action.  Ratification of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also furnishes a case study with respect to 
certain legislative strategies that proved effective.  It became part of the 
Constitution only after a lengthy period of intense consideration regarding 
relevant principles relating to presidential continuity.  Inasmuch as the 
Amendment represents the most recent and most successful experience in 
enhancing provisions to ensure presidential continuity, it is worth 
considering those constitutional principles and legislative strategies in 
assessing further measures. 
There are, of course, limits to the value of this exercise.  The context in 
2010 differs from that in the mid-1960s.  Public perceptions of our 
institutions, including the Presidency, differ in at least some respects from 
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the more generous views of the mid-1960s.  The specific continuity 
problems being addressed now differ somewhat from the paramount 
challenges of that period, in part because the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is 
now part of the constitutional architecture and some experience exists 
regarding its operation.  Nonetheless, the principles from, and story of, the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment should inform efforts to address remaining 
continuity problems. 
Remedying the remaining gaps presents an exercise in identifying 
problems, imagining solutions, and considering how those fixes might be 
accomplished.  But the lessons of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment show that 
the problem is much more difficult than these three steps suggest.  Given 
the general indifference to these matters, reformers face a formidable 
challenge in attracting interest to address contingencies that seem to pose 
only remote dangers, chronologically and in terms of their likelihood of 
occurring.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment succeeded in part because it 
followed discussion for a decade in some circles of many of the problems it 
addressed.  Education, of the public and of political elites, must precede any 
chance of meaningful reform. 
Imagining a menu of solutions is easier when each gap is viewed as a 
discrete problem.  In fact, ensuring continuity requires systemic thought.  
The issues interrelate and solutions in one area may cause unanticipated 
problems if care is not taken (and perhaps even if it is).  For instance, as 
previously discussed, moving away from a legislative line of succession has 
appeal in order to promote the continuity objectives of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Yet such a move would need to be carefully choreographed to 
avoid introducing problems into the system for addressing pre-inaugural 
continuity issues. The current succession law prescribes the same legislative 
line for all events.  Since Cabinet succession is not a feasible solution for 
pre-inaugural problems, this approach to post-inaugural double vacancies 
would require asymmetrical lines of succession after the Vice President.  
Even if legislative succession is retained in the pre-inaugural context, the 
Speaker as acting President may be more palatable in the failure to elect 
scenario than in the double death situation after her party loses the 
presidential election.  These instances simply illustrate a more pervasive 
problem of synchronizing reforms. 
Although the issue of presidential continuity requires systemic thought, 
legislative realities may dictate an incremental approach that addresses 
some problems while postponing action on others.  Moreover, reform will 
depend upon proponents being willing to forego preferred solutions to 
strike compromises.  That can only occur in a culture of compromise in 
which advocates measure success not in achieving a perfect solution but in 
improving on the troubling status quo.  The complexity of the mission is 
suggested by the fact that, although the gaps have long been apparent and 
although responses are easily imaginable, Congress has failed to exercise 
power it has long had or has acted in problematic ways. 
Reform will require constructing a package of measures to assure 
presidential continuity that are acceptable to Congress and other decision 
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makers, identifying leaders willing to pursue those objectives, mobilizing 
broad-based interest in addressing a problem of contingent rather than 
immediate consequence, and making the compromises and tactical choices 
necessary to make progress.  Those were among the accomplishments, and 
teachings of, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Further reform efforts should 
draw from its legacy and lessons to take the necessary next steps to help 
ensure presidential continuity. 
 
